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INTRODUCTION 
Zoning disputes provide many Americans with their only firsthand 
exposure to the workings of democratic government. Land use issues 
trigger participation because neighbors perceive the wrong kind of 
development as posing a double-barreled threat to the stability of the 
community in which they have chosen to live and to the economic value 
of their homes. 
The protagonists in zoning disputes—landowners and neighbors—
invest time and other resources to persuade the relevant decisionmakers 
to rule in the protagonists’ favor. When the parties make that 
investment, should they assume that a decision made today will have 
some enduring significance? Whether the decision is “final” may play 
an important role in shaping the parties’ participation and presentations. 
If a zoning board were free to deny a variance today and to grant the 
identical variance next week (or next year), there would be less reason 
for neighbors (and landowner applicants) to spend time and money 
framing their arguments for today’s decision. 
Many of the reasons that underlie res judicata doctrine apply to 
these local land use disputes. In the interest of conserving the resources 
of all parties—landowners, neighbors, and local decisionmakers—
issues should be decided once, not multiple times. There is little reason 
to think that, were the issues decided multiple times, subsequent 
determinations would improve on prior ones. This is especially true in 
the context of land use, where the issues involve primarily questions of 
fact, and parties have incentives to come forward with all relevant 
information at the time the first decisionmaker considers the dispute. 
If a court, rather than a zoning board, were resolving the dispute, res 
judicata doctrine would circumscribe the power of a subsequent court to 
depart from the earlier determination. In the first instance, however, 
zoning disputes are resolved not by the courts, but by local legislatures 
and administrative bodies. No finality principle comparable to res 
judicata attaches to legislative determinations, no matter which 
legislative body—Congress, a state legislature, or a local city council—
makes those determinations. Unlike most judicial decisions, which 
resolve discrete disputes over past events, legislatures act prospectively. 
Finality rules would preclude legislative decisionmakers from 
considering new facts that cast doubt on the wisdom of past decisions. It 
should not be surprising, then, that legislatures are typically free of 
2
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finality constraints. 
In contrast to the well-established principles that apply to judicial 
and legislative determinations, the applicability of finality principles is 
unclear when it comes to administrative decisions by the local zoning 
board, such as the grant or denial of a variance. Courts sometimes treat 
zoning board decisions as if they were judicial decisions, using res 
judicata language to preclude new applications for relief that the zoning 
board previously denied. In other cases, courts—often from the same 
jurisdictions—permit boards to entertain applications virtually identical 
to previously rejected applications. Although courts sometimes suggest 
the need to be “flexible” in applying res judicata doctrine to zoning 
disputes, neither courts nor scholars have offered a coherent prescriptive 
or descriptive account for how that flexibility does or should operate. 
This Article has two related objectives: to develop a normative 
theory explaining how finality principles should apply in the land use 
context and simultaneously to argue that existing case law, however 
inarticulately, reflects that normative theory. Part I begins by exploring 
the distinctive structure of zoning doctrine, which fits imperfectly with 
traditional categorization of decisions as legislative or judicial. Part II 
examines more generally the role of finality in legal decisionmaking. 
Part III demonstrates that, in light of the structure of zoning doctrine, 
traditional claim preclusion doctrine should have no place in zoning 
law. This Article argues, by contrast, that issue preclusion doctrine 
should and does operate to constrain zoning decisionmakers. The 
Article goes on to demonstrate that this framework explains the results, 
even if not the language, in the vast majority of zoning cases that raise 
finality issues. 
I.  THE STRUCTURE OF LAND USE LAW 
The starting point for most current zoning law begins with the 
Euclidean technique1 of dividing the municipality into districts, or 
zones, that separate incompatible uses. One might imagine this system 
operating mechanically: once the districts are established, all 
development proceeds as a matter of right. In practice, however, that is 
not how the zoning system has developed. Instead, zoning and land use 
issues require the exercise of judgment, not the application of 
mechanical rules. 
A.  The Discretionary Nature of the Land Use Process 
Discretion and judgment play important roles in the zoning process 
                                                                                                                     
 1. From its inception, land use law’s focus has been on regulation of externalities. In 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88, 394–95 (1926), the U.S. Supreme 
Court sustained the practice of zoning by analogizing it to nuisance law and emphasizing the 
effect that the use of one parcel of land might have on neighboring parcels.   
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primarily for two reasons. First, in any municipality of significant size, 
even the most well-intentioned and capable officials will be unable to 
anticipate the effect of a zoning ordinance on each and every parcel of 
land.2 Some restrictions on use or area may make particular parcels 
valueless. The compatibility of other uses with surrounding parcels may 
depend on individualized determinations not easily captured in a code. 
As a result, zoning ordinances typically have provisions that enable 
landowners to obtain administrative relief from strict application of the 
ordinance.3 
Second, municipalities generally have incentives to subject most 
new construction to discretionary review. A regime in which the 
municipality has power to impose conditions on development approvals 
enables the municipality to extract benefits from developers that would 
not be obtainable in a system where development proceeds “as of 
right.”4 For a large project, those benefits might include parkland or 
infrastructure improvements; for a smaller project, benefits might 
                                                                                                                     
 2. As the Supreme Court of California explained in Rubin v. Board of Directors, 104 
P.2d 1041 (Cal. 1940): 
A zoning ordinance places limitations upon the use of land within certain 
areas in accordance with a general policy which has been adopted. But because 
compliance with the ordinance may present unusual difficulties as to certain 
property, almost every zoning ordinance includes provisions under which an 
owner may apply to an administrative board for permission to put his land to a 
non-conforming use. This procedure . . . provides the opportunity “for 
amelioration of unnecessary hardships which, owing to special conditions, 
would result from literal enforcement of the restrictive features of the 
ordinance.” 
Id. at 1043 (quoting Thayer v. Bd. of Appeals, 157 A. 273, 275 (Conn. 1931)). 
 3. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2309 (2011) (authorizing boards of zoning appeals to 
grant variances and special exceptions to landowners). 
 4. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the power to impose conditions on 
development approvals gives municipalities considerable leverage over developers, and it has 
attempted to constrain municipalities by requiring a “nexus” between the permit condition and 
the reasons for requiring development approval. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 
837 & n.5 (1987); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1994) (explaining 
and applying the “nexus” requirement announced in Nollan). See generally Mark Fenster, 
Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 609 (2004). 
To make significant changes to the existing use of their land—changes such as 
subdividing parcels, initiating major development, or shifting the type or 
intensity of use—property owners typically must seek one or more 
discretionary approvals from the jurisdiction’s zoning authority or legislative 
body. During this process, local governments and property owners often 
negotiate over the exactions an applicant will accept as conditions for issuance 
of the necessary planning approval. 
Id. at 623 (citations omitted). 
4
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include planting trees or improving drainage by reducing impervious 
surfaces. Discretionary review comes in various forms. A landowner 
who wants to develop her property in a way not permitted by the zoning 
ordinance may seek amendment of the ordinance itself, either to permit 
a new use in the existing district or to include the landowner’s parcel in 
a different district. Amendment of the ordinance, like enactment of the 
ordinance itself, is generally the province of the municipal legislature, 
often known as the city council or town board.5 
Alternatively, a landowner can seek a variance from the local 
administrative body—typically the zoning board of appeals or board of 
adjustment—to use the landowner’s property in a manner not permitted 
within the district as currently zoned.6 Variances provide a “safety 
valve” for landowners who can establish that strict application of the 
ordinance would cause hardship (that is, the landowner could not obtain 
a reasonable return on the land as zoned), and thus avoid the need for 
frequent zoning amendments.7 Most ordinances require a landowner 
who seeks a “use” variance to establish, in addition to hardship, that the 
hardship is unique to the landowner’s parcel, and that granting the 
variance will not have an adverse impact on the surrounding 
neighborhood.8 Less stringent requirements usually apply to 
applications for “area” variances, which permit the landowner to modify 
setback requirements or other square footage requirements, but not to 
use the land in a manner otherwise prohibited by the ordinance.9 
Ordinances also make provision for special-use permits, sometimes 
called “conditional-use permits” or “special exceptions.”10 Although 
                                                                                                                     
 5. In some jurisdictions, the municipal legislature must refer amendments to a local 
planning commission or planning board before enacting an amendment. See, e.g., VA. CODE 
ANN. § 15.2-2285. 
 6. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2309(2). 
 7. See David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for 
Reform of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 283–84 (2004) (citations 
omitted) (noting that variances were designed to limit both constitutional attacks and frequent 
zoning amendments). 
 8. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2)(b) (McKinney 2011); see also 23 AM. JUR. 3D 
Proof of Facts § 13 (2011). The landowner must generally show: 
(1) [T]he land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a 
purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique 
circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood which may 
reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) that the use 
to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character of the 
locality. 
Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939). 
 9. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 267(1)(b), 267-b(3)(b). 
 10. See, e.g., id. § 274-b. For a general discussion of the terminology, see 3 ARDEN H. 
RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 61:9 (4th 
ed. 2010). 
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specially permitted uses explicitly are authorized by the zoning 
ordinance, the ordinance authorizes an administrative body to impose 
conditions that minimize the impact of the use on the surrounding 
community.11 Schools and churches are common specially permitted 
uses in residential districts. Although these uses are generally 
compatible with residential neighbors, concerns about traffic patterns, 
parking, and noise prevent many municipalities from authorizing these 
uses “as of right”; the special permit process thus enables an 
administrative body to protect the interests of neighbors.12 
Municipal land use ordinances typically offer still more 
opportunities for the exercise of municipal discretion, often requiring 
subdivision review13 or site plan review14 for significant development 
projects. The basic point, however, is that the land use process is rife 
with opportunities for the exercise of judgment by municipal officials. 
B.  The Decisionmakers 
Responsibility for zoning approvals is not typically centralized in a 
single decisionmaker. Zoning amendments tend to be the province of an 
elected local legislature, members of which often have no legal 
background. Although a landowner often makes the initial proposal for 
a zoning amendment, the local legislature generally does not owe the 
landowner any obligation to consider the amendment or to conduct a 
hearing. However, if the legislature favors the proposed amendment, the 
legislature may not enact an amendment without a public hearing.15 
Variances and special-use permits, by contrast, typically fall within 
the purview of the zoning board of appeals or board of adjustment (the 
“zoning board” or “board”).16 Members of the board, generally 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-b(1)–(2). 
 12. See, for example, Creswell v. Baltimore Aviation Service, Inc., 264 A.2d 838 (Md. 
1970):  
 
[T]he special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an 
administrative board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the 
legislative body has determined can, prima facie, properly be allowed in a 
specified use district, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular case which 
would change this presumptive finding. 
 
Id. at 842 (quoting Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. Bd. of Appeals, 262 A.2d 499, 502 (Md. 
1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2241 (2011). 
 14. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2246. 
 15. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2285(C) (requiring public hearing before governing body 
approves zoning amendment, but not requiring a hearing when governing body decides not to 
act). 
 16. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2309 (delineating powers of boards of zoning appeals, including 
authorization of variances and special exceptions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70 (West 2011) 
(conferring similar powers on board of adjustment). 
6
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appointed by the local legislature,17 are required to consider applications 
for variances and special-use permits, often within a statutorily 
mandated time frame.18 The board must conduct public hearings on 
each application and make decisions based on the record.19 Even when 
not required by statute, good practice requires the board to make 
findings to accompany its decision. Although the functions of the 
zoning board might be categorized as quasi-judicial, members of the 
board—like members of the legislature—do not need (and often do not 
have) legal training. 
However, judicial review is available to landowners or neighbors 
dissatisfied with the decision made by either body. In most states, courts 
will not overturn a zoning amendment unless the challenger can 
demonstrate that the amendment violates the Constitution or exceeds the 
authority state law confers on the local legislature.20 When a zoning 
board grants or denies a variance or special-use permit, courts review 
the determination for consistency with applicable statutory or common 
law standards, but give considerable deference to the board’s weighing 
of statutory considerations.21 
C.  Multiple Applications: The Finality Problem 
What consequences flow from an administrative body’s 
determination to deny (or to grant) a landowner’s application? Of 
course, an aggrieved landowner or neighbor can challenge the 
determination directly in court. But can a landowner simply apply 
again, hoping for a different result? To what extent is the municipal 
body’s decision final? 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(2) (McKinney 2011). Virginia has an unusual 
provision calling for a circuit court to appoint members of local boards of zoning appeals. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 15.2-2308(A). 
 18. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(8) (requiring decision within sixty-two days of 
public hearing). 
 19. Cf. Twin Cnty. Recycling Corp. v. Yevoli, 688 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 1997) (holding 
that denial of a special-use permit was improper when based on community pressure rather than 
record evidence). 
 20. See, e.g., Taylor v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 210 P.3d 532, 539 (Idaho 2009) 
(holding that action by county board of commissioners must be upheld unless the action is 
inconsistent with statutory mandates). By contrast, a number of state courts scrutinize zoning 
amendments more carefully. Some treat zoning amendments as “quasi-judicial” actions 
requiring an evidentiary showing that the amendment is consistent with a plan. See, e.g., Fasano 
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26, 29 (Or. 1973). In other states, proponents of a zoning 
amendment must demonstrate that the existing ordinance was the product of mistake, or that a 
change in circumstances has subsequently occurred. See, e.g., Clayman v. Prince George’s 
Cnty., 292 A.2d 689, 693–94 (Md. 1972). 
 21. See, e.g., Bontrager Auto Serv., Inc. v. Iowa City Bd. of Adjustment, 748 N.W.2d 
483, 496–97 (Iowa 2008) (applying a substantial evidence standard and holding that when the 
reasonableness of a board’s decision is open to “a fair difference of opinion,” the board’s 
decision should be affirmed). 
7
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Consider a concrete example. Suppose a zoning ordinance requires 
houses in a single-family district to be situated on lots of at least one 
acre. Suppose further that a landowner with a 1.75-acre parcel of land 
seeks a variance to permit construction of two houses on the property. 
The zoning board denies the variance. Five months—or five years—
later, the landowner seeks a similar variance. What is the effect of the 
previous variance denial? Must the zoning board deny the new 
application based on principles of claim or issue preclusion? Even if the 
zoning board is not compelled to deny the new application on preclusion 
grounds, may the board invoke claim or issue preclusion to avoid 
evaluating the subsequent application without a public hearing22 on the 
merits?23 
Although cases raising these finality questions occur frequently, 
neither courts nor academics have provided a coherent framework for 
analyzing them. Courts recognize the importance of finality and often 
invoke preclusion principles, but they just as frequently reject the 
application of preclusion principles to nearly identical situations. While 
leading treatises discuss the finality problem, they are largely content to 
collect the cases and discuss them individually.24 Careful analysis of the 
problem requires an understanding of the role of finality in government 
decisions more generally, a subject to which this Article now turns. 
II.  FINALITY IN GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS 
Finality principles distinguish sharply between legislative and 
judicial decisionmaking. Although the U.S. Constitution precludes a 
legislature from imposing retroactive criminal penalties,25 legislators 
enjoy almost complete freedom to ignore or reverse the decisions of 
their predecessors in civil matters. The federal and state constitutions 
typically authorize legislation to promote the public welfare, even if that 
legislation significantly impairs reliance interests. The Takings and 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING 
AND PLANNING § 2:3 (4th ed. 2010) (“As a procedural requirement, due process generally 
requires . . . a ‘fair hearing’ when governmental bodies adjudicate, or perform the quasi-judicial 
function of determining the rights of a particular landowner in regard to the use and 
development of his land under criteria for approval set out in a zoning code.”). 
 23. While courts typically defer to zoning board determinations of land use applications, 
Cowan v. Kern, 363 N.E.2d 305, 310 (N.Y. 1977), courts will not defer to the extent that the 
board’s behavior is arbitrary and capricious. Anderson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 217 P.3d 401, 
405 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008)) (“We 
continue to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard as a ‘safety net’ designed to ‘catch 
agency action which prejudices a party’s substantial rights . . . .’”). A board determination made 
without consideration of the merits of the claim certainly would be arbitrary and capricious—
unless preclusion principles excused the board from reconsidering the merits. 
 24. See 4 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING 
AND PLANNING §§ 68:11–68:17 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing results in various categories of cases); 
4 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 40:49–40:53 (5th ed. 2010) (same). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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Contract Clauses impose modest constraints, at most, on legislative 
power to change policy.26 
In the legislative context, democracy requires the subordination of 
finality to flexibility. A democratic system permits proponents of a 
particular policy to introduce new data to persuade legislators and 
voters, and permits those decisionmakers to change course based on 
either the new data or a different evaluation of old data. As a result, 
today’s decisions about how to provide health care and how to regulate 
financial markets do not preclude subsequent Congresses or state 
legislatures from repealing or amending the laws.  
By contrast, when judicial decisions are at issue, finality principles 
often close the door to judicial reconsideration of previously decided 
matters. When two parties have obtained judicial resolution of their 
dispute, claim preclusion and issue preclusion principles bind both the 
parties and a subsequent court to that resolution, even if the court 
believes the prior court’s decision was incorrect on the facts or the 
law.27 
Why should finality be more critical when judicial decisions are at 
stake than when the decisions are legislative? And where do zoning 
decisions fit within that framework? Answering those questions requires 
an understanding of the reasons for finality principles generally.  
A.  The Foundations of Preclusion Doctrine 
Preclusion doctrine rests on a combination of efficiency and 
fairness concerns. First, precluding relitigation of previously decided 
issues conserves judicial resources.28 Permitting relitigation either 
                                                                                                                     
 26. The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property 
for public use without just compensation, and therefore potentially makes it more expensive for 
the government to change decisions that adversely affect private property rights. See generally 
Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE 
L.J. 203, 210–14 (2004) (noting that the Takings Clause protects primarily against legal 
change). But the Takings Clause rarely operates to invalidate state and local land use regulation, 
unless the regulation deprives a landowner of all economic use of its land. See, e.g., Lucas v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
The Contracts Clause in Article I of the Constitution also makes it more expensive for 
legislatures to change course, by requiring them to abide by their contracts. The Supreme Court, 
however, has rarely invoked the Contracts Clause to invalidate state legislation. But see U.S. 
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977). 
 27. Claim and issue preclusion are not the only principles that recognize the importance of 
finality in judicial decisions. Stare decisis often leads courts to abide by past decisions with 
which they disagree. The stare decisis command, however, is a relatively weaker mandate than 
claim and issue preclusion. Although adherence to precedent is the general rule, American 
courts universally accept the principle that courts should, at least sometimes, be free to overrule 
past precedent. 
 28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 11 (1982) (“Indefinite 
continuation of a dispute is a social burden. It consumes time and energy that may be put to 
other use, not only of the parties but of the community as a whole. . . . The law of res judicata 
reduces these burdens . . . .”). Similarly, the Supreme Court has observed that res judicata “has 
9
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would require more judges, or would require that a fixed corps of judges 
devote less attention to new issues not previously subject to litigation. 
Moreover, because subsequent judges are, as a class, no more likely to 
reach an accurate outcome than prior judges, the additional resources 
expended on relitigation would not generate commensurate benefits.29 
Second, precluding relitigation improves the quality of 
decisionmaking by increasing the incentive for litigating parties to 
advance all of their arguments and to marshal all of their evidence at 
once.30 In most jurisdictions, preclusion doctrine prevents parties from 
splitting claims in ways that allow them to “save” arguments and 
evidence for a subsequent proceeding, should they lose the first time 
around.31 
Third, from a fairness perspective, preclusion protects a successful 
litigant from having to expend time and resources defending against 
duplicative litigation.32 By denying litigants a second bite at the apple, 
preclusion doctrine advances a policy of repose.33 
Each of these rationales for preclusion doctrine could also be 
applied in the context of legislation. If legislators could not revisit past 
decisions, they could devote more time to new issues. Lobbyists would 
have more incentive to come forward in the first instance if legislators 
were bound by their initial decisions. Citizens who once prevailed in the 
legislative process would be relieved from the fear that legislators 
would later succumb to pressure by those who had previously lost in the 
process. 
There are, however, critical differences between the judicial and 
legislative processes that explain why preclusion doctrines generally do 
not apply to legislation. Perhaps the most important is that legislation 
typically applies prospectively while litigation operates 
retrospectively.34 Legislative decisions involve prediction about the 
                                                                                                                     
the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the 
same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. 
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328–29 (1971)). 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 10 (“[F]inality attaches not 
because the courts are infallible but because they are inevitably fallible.”). 
 30. Cf. id. at 8–10 (noting that strict rules of finality are more appropriate in a legal 
regime that permits and encourages parties to raise all of their legal claims in a single 
proceeding). 
 31. Cf. id. § 24 cmt. a (“The law of res judicata now reflects the expectation that parties 
who are given the capacity to present their ‘entire controversies’ shall in fact do so.”). 
 32. See Isaac v. Truck Serv., Inc., 752 A.2d 509, 513 (Conn. 2000) (identifying one policy 
of res judicata as “provid[ing] repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious 
litigation”). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 11 (“[The law of res judicata] holds 
that at some point arguable questions of right and wrong for practical purposes simply cannot be 
argued any more. It compels repose.”). 
 34. Note also that preclusion in litigation only binds parties to the litigation; preclusion in 
the legislative arena would bind everyone, including those who originally had little reason to 
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effects particular decisions will produce in the future, while litigation 
focuses on concrete events that occurred in the past. All of the 
information about past events is, at least theoretically, available when a 
court makes its decision. The same is not true of prospective legislative 
decisions. As time passes, new information will emerge that confirms or 
undermines the predictions on which the legislative decision was 
premised.35 A rule precluding reconsideration of the decision would 
disable legislatures from incorporating that information into policy 
decisions. 
More generally, rules precluding relitigation of disputes pose little 
threat to democratic decisionmaking because legislatures remain free to 
overturn any policies embodied in a past judgment. By contrast, a rule 
precluding repeal or modification of existing legislation would impose 
intolerable constraints on the power of subsequent legislatures to 
implement policy choices preferred by contemporary constituents.36 
Two related doctrines embody the prohibition against duplicative 
litigation. Claim preclusion doctrine (often referred to by its more 
traditional label, res judicata) provides that a judgment in favor of either 
party to a litigation extinguishes all of the claims the plaintiff could 
have advanced against the defendant arising out of the same set of 
transactions that gave rise to the claim the plaintiff actually advanced.37 
The basic principle is that parties with an opportunity to present an 
entire controversy within a single proceeding must do so.38 A final 
judgment precludes a party from bringing a subsequent proceeding, 
even if the party seeks to advance new theories, present new evidence, 
or obtain different remedies.39 
Issue preclusion doctrine (traditionally known as collateral estoppel) 
operates both more broadly and more narrowly than claim preclusion 
doctrine. When a party has unsuccessfully litigated an issue in a 
proceeding, issue preclusion prevents relitigation of that issue, even in a 
subsequent proceeding on an unrelated claim.40 On the other hand, the 
                                                                                                                     
worry about the legislation’s impact and therefore little incentive to participate in the legislative 
process. 
 35. Cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 25 TEX. L. REV. 199, 
204 (1947) (noting that in areas where “lively problems of law” arise, decisionmakers should 
“not be barred from using trial-and-error methods” of resolving legal questions). 
 36. Cf. Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts 
Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 647 (1988) (noting that “in a democratic system, legislatures 
are generally free to reverse” policy choices). 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (providing that claim preclusion 
doctrine extinguishes “all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to 
all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action 
arose”). 
 38. Id. § 24 cmt. a (“The law of res judicata now reflects the expectation that parties who 
are given the capacity to present their ‘entire controversies’ shall in fact do so.”). 
 39. Id. § 25. 
 40. Id. § 27 (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid 
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doctrine applies only to claims actually litigated and necessarily 
determined. Issue preclusion does not apply to an issue or theory a party 
could have raised in a prior proceeding, but did not.41 
While the application of preclusion principles to judicial decisions 
has a long pedigree, it is equally well-established that preclusion 
principles do not apply to legislative decisions. It is less clear how these 
principles apply to zoning determinations and other decisions that do 
not fit neatly into the “legislative” and “judicial” categories. 
B.  Application to Administrative Proceedings 
With the advent and growth of administrative agencies, courts and 
scholars grappled over whether preclusion principles should apply to 
administrative decisions that shared some, but not all, of the hallmarks 
associated with court judgments.42 But it has long since been clear that 
preclusion principles are ill-suited to agency rulemaking decisions.43 
But even when agencies act in a more adjudicative mode, agency 
decisions do not provide all of the trappings familiar to adversarial 
judicial proceedings. For instance, agencies need not follow the rules of 
evidence.44 There is often no formal transcript of the proceedings.45 
Moreover, statutes rigidly limit the issues agencies may decide, and 
non-lawyers often make agency decisions. 
Nevertheless, agency decisionmaking would be crippled if finality 
                                                                                                                     
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is 
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim.”). 
 41. Id. § 27 cmt. e (“A judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to issues 
which might have been but were not litigated and determined in the prior action.”). Similarly, 
the judgment will not be conclusive when the issue was not recognized by the parties as 
important, or not recognized by the fact-finder as necessary to the first judgment. See id. § 27 
cmt. j. 
 42. Historically, courts refused to give administrative decisions res judicata effect because 
administrative agencies are instruments of executive, not judicial, power. See, e.g., Pearson v. 
Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1906). However, in light of the proliferation of administrative 
hearings during the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen an 
administrative agency [acts] in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact . . . which 
the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” there is “neither need nor justification 
for a second evidentiary hearing on these matters already resolved as between these two 
parties.” United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). For a scholarly 
discussion of preclusion principles as applied to administrative decisions, see generally Davis, 
supra note 35; Rex R. Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive 
Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 FLA. L. REV. 422 (1983).  
 43. Among the reasons for the mismatch between preclusion and rulemaking is the 
absence of identified parties in most rulemaking contexts. See Davis, supra note 35, at 230 & 
n.132. 
 44. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11(2) (West 2010). 
 45. In some states, statutes require zoning boards to provide a verbatim recording of 
proceedings. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-10(f) (West 2011). In other states, transcripts 
are unnecessary unless requested by a party willing to pay for those transcripts. See, e.g., MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11(6). 
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principles did not apply at all.46 If protagonists in administrative 
proceedings were given unlimited freedom to bring the same claims 
repeatedly, the system would be burdened by the same unfairness and 
inefficiencies that preclusion rules are designed to avoid. Indeed, the 
failure to apply those principles to administrative determinations would 
generate perverse results: in order to obtain the benefits of finality, the 
prevailing party would have an incentive to seek judicial review of a 
favorable determination.47 Applying preclusion doctrine to 
administrative determinations eliminates that incentive. It should not be 
surprising, then, that at least since the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in 
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.,48 it has been clear 
that res judicata principles extend to administrative determinations. 
Preclusion doctrine, however, attaches only to administrative 
determinations that are adjudicative, not to determinations that are 
legislative or managerial.49 This distinction is justified by the same 
reasons that bar application of preclusion doctrine to legislative 
determinations. Rulemaking determinations tend to focus on prediction 
and policy rather than on evaluation of events that have already 
occurred.50 Moreover, rulemaking determinations bind parties whose 
individual interests are so small that they cannot be expected to 
participate in the rulemaking process. 
No talismanic factor determines when an administrative 
determination is sufficiently adjudicative to permit application of 
preclusion principles. The more an agency’s action resembles a trial 
court’s determination, the stronger the case for classifying the action as 
adjudicative.51 When legal principles bind the agency to make a 
decision on a legal claim, preclusion principles typically will apply, so 
                                                                                                                     
 46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 cmt. b (“The importance of bringing a 
legal controversy te [sic] conclusion is generally no less when the tribunal is an administrative 
tribunal than when it is a court.”). 
 47. Court judgments are, of course, entitled to res judicata effect. Therefore, were 
administrative determinations given no preclusive effect, the prevailing party in an 
administrative proceeding, if concerned about subsequent efforts to relitigate, would have an 
incentive to seek judicial review of the administrative determination to obtain the res judicata 
effect afforded to court judgments. 
 48. 384 U.S. 394, 422–23 (1966). 
 49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 cmt. b. 
 50. Indeed, Professor Davis argued that courts sometimes focus too much effort on 
labeling administrative determinations as “legislative” or “adjudicative.” He suggested, instead, 
that courts should focus more on whether the reasons for preventing relitigation are present. 
Thus, he argued that ratemaking decisions should not be given preclusive effect because “[a] 
rate desirable for one period of time may be undesirable for another period,” regardless of 
whether the ratemaking proceeding is deemed legislative or judicial. Davis, supra note 35, at 
231. Conversely, “a second adjudication of static facts is undesirable in absence of some special 
reason for permitting it.” Id. at 232. 
 51. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.3, at 1132 (Aspen 
Publishers 5th ed. 2010) (“The starting point in drawing the line is the observation that res 
judicata applies when what the agency does resembles what a trial court does.”). 
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long as the agency’s procedural process provides adequate safeguards to 
ensure that the parties to be bound have had a fair hearing on their 
claim.52 
Many zoning determinations fit squarely within the adjudicative 
framework. When a zoning board considers a variance or special permit 
application, or interprets a local zoning ordinance, an applicant is 
entitled to a final determination of his claim, usually within a statutorily 
mandated time period.53 In making that determination, the zoning board 
must apply settled legal principles to the facts presented by the 
applicant.54 Moreover, the board must afford notice to interested parties 
(usually neighbors who own land within a specified distance from the 
applicant’s parcel) and must conduct a public hearing at which all 
parties have an opportunity to present and rebut evidence.55 
Preclusion doctrines therefore would appear to apply to requests for 
review by a zoning board. A system that allows an unsuccessful party to 
reapply for the same relief month after month, requiring adversaries to 
show up each month to oppose the relief and the board to decide each 
repeated application anew, would be intolerable. It should not be 
surprising, then, that courts find preclusion principles relevant to these 
applications. 
                                                                                                                     
 52. The Restatement treats an administrative determination as adjudicative only if the 
agency determines a matter that “includes a legal claim, that is, an assertion by one party against 
another cast in terms of entitlement under substantive law to particular relief.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 cmt. b. The comment goes on to provide that “[a] petition for a 
benefit from the government is not a legal claim unless the agency is obliged to grant the 
petition upon a showing of the existence of conditions specified by law.” Id. Once the 
determination is deemed to be adjudicative, res judicata principles apply only if adequate 
procedural safeguards, such as the provision of adequate notice to the parties to be bound, the 
right to present and rebut evidence and argument, and the ultimate rendering of a final decision, 
accompany the determination. Id. § 83(2). 
 53. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-73 (West 2011) (imposing a 120-day period 
within which the board must render decisions). 
 54. See generally, e.g., id. § 40:55D-70 (providing that no variance shall be granted 
“without a showing that such variance or other relief can be granted without substantial 
detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the 
zone plan and zoning ordinance”). 
 55. In an early, influential case, the New Jersey Supreme Court catalogued the foundation 
for applying preclusion doctrine in zoning cases, focusing specifically on the creation of the 
record: 
To fail to accord the findings of a board of adjustment, especially where the 
proceedings are formal and adversary, as is the case here, the effect of res 
judicata would be most inconsistent with this goal. In addition, the function of 
boards of adjustment, in deciding an application made under N.J.S.A. 40:55-
39(c), is essentially factfinding, as opposed to policymaking. The party seeking 
the variance must present evidence sufficient to allow the board to act. Other 
interested parties may be heard.  The board is not entitled to act on facts not 
part of the record. 
Russell v. Bd. of Adjustment, 155 A.2d 83, 87 (N.J. 1959) (citations omitted). 
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By contrast, when a landowner seeks a zoning amendment from a 
municipal legislature, the legislature need not act on the landowner’s 
request, and certainly need not do so within a specified time frame. 
Although the legislature must act within the statutory authority 
conferred by the state zoning enabling act, the legislature faces no other 
significant legal constraints on its ultimate decision. Policy, not law, is 
the legislature’s primary concern. Neither a decision to amend the 
ordinance, nor a decision not to amend, has the hallmarks of an 
adjudicative determination. As a result, preclusion doctrines should 
not—and do not—apply to zoning amendments.56 
C.  Limits to Preclusion Doctrine 
Neither claim nor issue preclusion doctrine provides ironclad 
protection against relitigation of claims,57 regardless of whether the first 
determination was made by a court or by an administrative body. Four 
qualifications are particularly relevant in the context of zoning 
determinations. 
First, because both claim and issue preclusion are common law 
doctrines, both must yield to a statutory command permitting 
relitigation. Preclusion principles do not require or even allow 
adherence to the first determination where a legislature has identified 
justifications—such as public policy—to permit a second litigation.58 
For instance, the Supreme Court has invoked a federal statute to hold 
that a state agency proceeding that rejected an age-discrimination claim 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See Price v. City of Georgetown, 375 S.E.2d 335, 337 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he 
doctrine of res judicata is generally held to be nonapplicable to a change of zone case because 
changing a zone is a legislative act of the zoning authority . . . .”). In a number of states, 
however, courts have expressed suspicion of piecemeal zoning changes, not so much because of 
finality concerns, but rather because they fear that those changes may be the product of political 
influence. As a result, in those states, a municipality may only amend its zoning ordinance if it 
demonstrates that there has been a change in circumstances or that the original ordinance was 
the product of mistake. The “change-mistake rule” is most closely associated with Maryland, 
but constrains municipal power to depart from precedent in other states, as well. See, e.g., 
Clayman v. Prince George’s Cnty., 292 A.2d 689, 693–94 (Md. 1972); Bd. of Alderman v. 
Conerly, 509 So. 2d 877, 883 (Miss. 1987); Albuquerque Commons P’ship v. City Council, 184 
P.3d 411, 419 (N.M. 2008). 
Other states treat zoning amendments as quasi-judicial and require the party seeking the 
amendment to establish a need for it. The leading case is Fasano v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23, 29 (Or. 1973). See also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 
2d 469, 476 (Fla. 1993); Cooper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 614 P.2d 947, 950–51 (Idaho 1980). 
This quasi-judicial treatment, however, is motivated not by finality concerns, but by concerns 
about the “almost irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on 
local government.” Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30. 
 57. Exceptions to claim preclusion and issue preclusion doctrine are collected in the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 26, 28. 
 58. See id. § 20(1)(c) (providing that a judgment for a defendant does not bar another 
action by a plaintiff “[w]hen by statute or rule of court the judgment does not operate as a bar to 
another action on the same claim”). 
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does not bar a plaintiff from bringing the same claim in a subsequent 
federal court proceeding.59 
Second, if the initial forum provides that its determination should 
not have preclusive effect, the plaintiff is not precluded from seeking 
relief in a second forum, even if no statute supplants preclusion 
doctrine. For instance, when a forum dismisses a plaintiff’s claim 
“without prejudice,” the dismissal does not bar a subsequent suit.60 That 
is, if the first forum concludes that the case has not yet been explored 
sufficiently to preclude a subsequent action, the court may so indicate, 
leaving a second forum free to hear the case. 
Third, claim preclusion does not apply when a formal barrier 
prevented the plaintiff from presenting the entire claim in the first 
forum. In that circumstance, preclusion doctrine does not interfere with 
the plaintiff’s ability to raise in a second forum those aspects of the 
claim that the first forum could not adjudicate.61 Suppose, for instance, 
that an employee brings a negligence action against his employer, 
contending that the alleged negligence occurred outside the scope of his 
employment. Suppose further that the court concludes that the 
negligence occurred within the scope of the employment and dismisses 
the suit, asserting that the employee’s exclusive remedy is workers’ 
compensation. The court’s dismissal in these circumstances does not bar 
the employee from subsequently seeking workers’ compensation, 
because such relief was not available in the first forum.62 
The fourth limitation is of paramount importance in many land use 
cases: a judgment does not bar a claim arising from facts that occur after 
the judgment is rendered.63 Suppose, for example, that pursuant to a 
judgment of divorce, a court awards custody to the child’s mother, 
rejecting the father’s claim that the mother is unsuitable. If the mother 
later engages in behavior that makes her unsuitable, the prior award 
does not bar the court from awarding custody to the father.64 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106, 110–11 (1991). 
The Court relied on a statute tying the time for filing federal court claims to the date of filing a 
prior claim with a state agency. Id. at 111 (citations omitted).  The Court read the statute to 
express a Congressional intention that plaintiffs be afforded a forum in federal court even after 
an unsuccessful proceeding before a state agency.  Id. 
 60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(1)(b). 
 61. Id. § 26(1)(c); see also id. § 26 cmt. c. 
 62. The same issue would arise in the land use context if a zoning board were confronted 
with a variance application from a landowner whose site plan had been rejected by a planning 
board for failure to comply with the zoning ordinance. Because the planning board lacked 
authority to grant a variance, the planning board’s determination would not preclude the zoning 
board from considering a variance application. 
 63. Id. § 24 cmt. f (“Material operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with 
respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the 
antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not 
precluded by the first.”). 
 64. Id. § 24 cmt. f, illus. 11. 
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III.  PRECLUSION DOCTRINE IN LAND USE CASES 
Preclusion doctrine presents a difficult fit in zoning and land use 
cases. On the one hand, finality is an important value in land use law, as 
it is in other areas of law. Without some form of preclusion, 
neighborhood residents and zoning boards face the prospect of devoting 
resources to duplicative applications by persistent landowners. On the 
other hand, facts relevant to a variance or special permit decision may 
change—sometimes significantly—with the passage of time. Strict 
application of preclusion doctrines threatens to freeze the use of land 
over time, despite changes in market conditions and neighborhood 
character. 
Many courts deal with this conflict by indicating that a zoning 
determination is entitled to res judicata effect unless circumstances have 
changed since the determination was made.65 That formulation, 
however, is not helpful in understanding the doctrine because 
circumstances have always changed. The passage of time inevitably 
brings changes, some more perceptible than others. If these judicial 
pronouncements were taken literally, res judicata principles would be 
irrelevant in all zoning cases. 
Most courts do not, however, conclude that any change in 
circumstances prevents application of preclusion doctrine, nor do they 
conduct independent examinations to determine whether the changes 
have been significant. Instead, most courts, as a matter of practice, 
conclude that conditions have changed if—and only if—the zoning 
board decides they have changed.66 As a result, the zoning board is 
nearly always successful when it invokes preclusion doctrine in a land 
use dispute. Conversely, preclusion claims advanced by neighbors and 
landowners almost inevitably fail.67 
At first glance, this result appears somewhat perverse and 
inconsistent with traditional preclusion doctrine, which generally holds 
                                                                                                                     
 65. See, e.g., Bentley v. Valco, Inc., 741 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Colo. App. 1987) (“A zoning 
authority can reverse itself if there has been a substantial change in the facts or circumstances 
subsequent to the earlier hearing . . . .”). 
 66. Sometimes courts make this point explicitly. In an early New Jersey Supreme Court 
case, the court held that whether the changed conditions “requirement has been met is for the 
board, in the first instance, to determine. This finding, as any other made by the board, will be 
overturned on review only if it is shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Russell v. 
Bd. of Adjustment, 155 A.2d 83, 88 (N.J. 1959) (citations omitted); see also Freeman v. Town 
of Ithaca Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 403 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (App. Div. 1978) (“[I]t is for the board 
to determine whether or not changed facts or circumstances are presented . . . .”). 
 67. A narrow exception applies when the board refuses to consider whether conditions 
have changed. Compare Marks v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 203 A.2d 761, 763 (R.I. 1964) 
(invalidating grant of variance, but noting that whether change of conditions has occurred “is, in 
the first instance, for the board to determine”), with Marks v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 232 A.2d 
382, 383–84 (R.I. 1967) (quashing a grant of variance to same landowner despite the board’s 
determination that, based on the evidence, circumstances had changed). 
17
Sterk and Brunelle: Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res Judicata Doctrine in Land
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1156 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
all parties equally bound by the result of a prior proceeding. Properly 
understood, however, prevailing judicial practice is quite consistent 
with preclusion principles. Claim preclusion doctrine does not bar 
subsequent claims when the earlier tribunal did not consider, and could 
not have considered, the impact of post-determination occurrences.68 
Issue preclusion doctrine, however, makes the first determination 
binding with respect to all issues actually and necessarily determined by 
the first tribunal.69 That is, the initial decision finally determines that the 
landowner was, or was not, entitled to a variance or a permit as the facts 
existed at the time of the application. At the time of the initial decision, 
however, the board cannot determine if facts will subsequently arise that 
will make the decision obsolete. 
Whether circumstances have changed since the zoning board’s 
initial decision is not a matter for a subsequent court to decide de novo. 
Instead, on that issue, as on other fact issues in zoning cases, courts can 
and should defer to the determination of the zoning board. As a result, 
when a zoning board invokes res judicata to refuse to hear a subsequent 
application by a landowner or a neighbor, a combination of issue 
preclusion doctrine and principles of deference to administrative 
determinations dictates judicial affirmance of the administrative 
determination. By contrast, when a board seeks to revisit a prior 
determination over the objection of a landowner or neighbor, preclusion 
doctrine does not stand in the way. Even though the prior decision was 
entitled to issue preclusion effect, the board’s subsequent decision that 
circumstances have changed since the initial determination overcomes 
the effect of preclusion. 
This Part explores the various fact situations in which preclusion 
claims arise, demonstrating in each case that, with narrow exceptions, 
claim preclusion doctrine is and should be irrelevant, and that courts 
consistently (if somewhat inartfully) serve finality interests by 
combining issue preclusion doctrine with principles of deference to 
local zoning board determinations. 
A.  Preclusion Claims by Applicant Landowners 
Landowners applying for variances, special permits, or other 
administrative relief rarely have occasion to invoke preclusion doctrine. 
In some ways, a landowner–applicant resembles a plaintiff in ordinary 
civil litigation. If a civil plaintiff brings an action and loses, preclusion 
doctrine is of no use to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff wins, and the 
                                                                                                                     
 68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (“Material operative facts 
occurring after the decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in 
themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may 
be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first.”). 
 69. Id. § 27. 
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defendant immediately pays, the plaintiff also has no reason to rely on 
preclusion doctrine.70 Thus, preclusion doctrine is only useful to the 
plaintiff as a means of obtaining relief from a recalcitrant defendant.71 
Similarly, if a zoning board denies the landowner’s initial application, 
the landowner has no reason to invoke preclusion principles. And if the 
zoning board grants the landowner’s application, the landowner has no 
need to invoke preclusion principles; grant of the variance allows the 
landowner to develop in accordance with the application. Nevertheless, 
three situations arise in which landowner–applicants invoke preclusion 
doctrine. 
1.  Time-Limited Variances and Special Permits 
To take into account the possibility of changed circumstances, 
some state statutes72 and many local ordinances73 limit the duration of 
variances and special permits; if a landowner does not act on the 
approval within a specified period of time, the approval expires, and the 
landowner must reapply. Even when the ordinance itself does not limit 
the duration of variances or special permits, the zoning board, when 
approving an application, may impose conditions on the grant. For 
example, the board might require the landowner to start (or complete) 
construction by a particular date, or to reapply after a certain time 
period even if construction is complete. When the landowner reapplies 
with an identical application and is rejected, may the landowner invoke 
res judicata principles to object to the board’s denial of the subsequent 
application? 
In this situation, the landowner’s preclusion claim should not, and 
generally does not, succeed. 8131 Roosevelt Corp. v. Zoning Board of 
Adjustment74 illustrates the problem. The zoning board initially granted 
                                                                                                                     
 70. In fact, preclusion doctrine may be of more value to the losing defendant, because it 
bars the plaintiff from seeking additional relief. See id. § 18 cmt. b. 
 71. See id. § 18 cmt. c (noting the value of preclusion doctrine in assisting plaintiffs 
seeking to execute on a judgment); see also id. § 18 cmt. d (discussing the value of preclusion, 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in obtaining enforcement in sister states). 
 72. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 10 (West 2010) (limiting duration of 
variances to one year). 
 73. See, e.g., Twigg v. Town of Kennebunk, 662 A.2d 914, 915 (Me. 1995) (discussing a 
local ordinance that provides for expiration of variance within six months if construction has not 
begun); Omnivest v. Stewartstown Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., 641 A.2d 648, 649 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1994) (discussing a local ordinance that provides for expiration of variance when a 
successful applicant does not obtain a building permit or use certificate within six months). 
 74. 794 A.2d 963 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). Similarly, in Twigg, a prior landowner was 
granted two identical area variances to build a single-family dwelling, both of which expired 
due to his failure to record the variances and begin construction within the required time. 662 
A.2d at 915. The subsequent landowner purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and applied 
for an identical variance after the prior variance expired one month into his ownership. Id. The 
board denied his application, finding that the landowner failed to prove that the land could not 
yield a reasonable return without the variance, even though the board necessarily determined 
this issue in the affirmative in the first two applications. See id. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
19
Sterk and Brunelle: Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res Judicata Doctrine in Land
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1158 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
the landowner a two-year variance to use his property as an adult 
cabaret. When the variance expired, the board denied an application for 
an identical variance,75 concluding that the landowner had not proven 
lack of adverse impact on the neighborhood, despite the board’s 
contrary determination in the first application.76 The board relied in part 
on complaints by abutting neighbors.77 In upholding the board’s 
determination, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania rejected the 
landowner’s claim that res judicata bound the board to its previous 
decision.78 The court reiterated that the grant of a temporary variance 
did not purport to determine whether the elements of a variance had 
been met permanently; rather, each determination was limited to the 
specific two-year period and was subject to re-evaluation upon 
reapplication.79 
By limiting the initial variance to a two-year period, the zoning 
board in 8131 Roosevelt essentially signaled that it was reserving 
judgment on whether a variance would be appropriate in the future. The 
situation is the same where a prior adjudication expressly authorizes 
splitting of a claim. In that scenario, claim preclusion doctrine does not 
extinguish the portion of the claim reserved for future decision.80 
Similarly, claim preclusion doctrine always yields to a legislative 
determination that the doctrine should not apply. In each of these 
instances, the rationales for the doctrine are inapplicable. An 
authoritative decisionmaker—either the prior court or the legislature—
has determined that the facts and issues before the second 
decisionmaker will be sufficiently different to permit a new evaluation 
of the parties’ claims.81 The second tribunal will not, therefore, be 
                                                                                                                     
Judicial Court of Maine not only declined to apply claim preclusion to the reconsideration of the 
application, but also failed to apply issue preclusion to the “reasonable return” determination 
that the only beneficial use of the land was for residential purposes. See id. at 918–19. 
 75. 8131 Roosevelt, 794 A.2d at 965. The property previously had been used as a go-go 
dance club. Id. 
 76. Id. at 965–66. 
 77. Id. at 966. The board also determined that the landowner did not prove unnecessary 
hardship, but did not further elaborate on that finding. Id. 
 78. Id. at 969. Arguably, the ability of the zoning board to reconsider the variance 
application was more explicable in 8131 Roosevelt, in which the variance was unambiguously 
temporary, see id. at 969, than in Omnivest, where the validity of the variance could be affected 
only by a failure to record or begin construction within a given time period. See 641 A.2d at 
649. In both instances, however, the court deferred to the board’s determination to reconsider 
the application. 
 79. 8131 Roosevelt, 794 A.2d at 969; see also Twigg, 662 A.2d at 915; Maurice Callahan 
& Sons, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 565 N.E.2d 813, 815–16 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Lopes v. Bd. of 
Appeals, 543 N.E.2d 421, 422 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989); Hunters Brook Realty Corp. v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals, 436 N.E.2d 978, 983–84 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); Citrus Trust v. Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals, No. 54231, 1989 WL 4130, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1989); Omnivest, 641 A.2d at 
652. 
 80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(b) (1982); see also id. § 26 cmt. b. 
 81. See Lopes, 543 N.E.2d at 422 (construing a Massachusetts statute that provided for 
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duplicating the work of the first. Moreover, when the facts before the 
second tribunal are different, that tribunal does not disrespect the work 
of its predecessor when it reaches a different conclusion. 
The zoning board in 8131 Roosevelt, by placing time limits on the 
grant of the variance, explicitly permitted, and even required, that the 
landowner’s claim be split into separate pieces—the board determined 
the first piece, whether a time-limited variance should be issued, and 
reserved the rest for future decision. Because claim preclusion doctrine 
is inapplicable, the grant of the time-limited variance does not preclude 
the landowner from seeking a subsequent identical variance upon 
expiration of the first. On the other hand, it also does not preclude the 
board from denying the new variance or permit application. 
In contrast, the temporary nature of a variance will not necessarily 
prevent the operation of issue preclusion doctrine. While a board can 
reasonably decide that circumstances might change over the ensuing 
two years, reserving for itself the power to make a different decision 
that takes into account  facts that subsequently unfold, a board cannot 
reasonably decide that its decision would be different two years hence 
on precisely the same facts. As a result, the board’s current decision will 
bind the board in the future so long as the facts do not change.82 If, for 
instance, grant of a variance requires the board to make a finding that 
the land is no longer suitable for permitted uses within the district, issue 
preclusion doctrine would require a subsequent board to adhere to that 
determination in the absence of evidence of changed circumstances.83 
But issue preclusion doctrine does not prevent a subsequent zoning 
board from denying a variance based on circumstances not before the 
earlier board. As discussed above, courts typically defer to board 
determinations as to whether facts have materially changed since its 
earlier decision. Thus, in 8131 Roosevelt, the court upheld the zoning 
board’s determination that the neighbors’ experience with the cabaret 
                                                                                                                     
lapse of variance after one year and noting that “[t]he application of claim or issue preclusion 
principles in the event of a lapsed variance would undermine the purpose of the lapse provision: 
to force the applicant to justify the variance he seeks unassisted by the earlier proceedings”); 
Hunters Brook Realty Corp., 436 N.E.2d at 983–84 (invoking the same statute to reject 
preclusion argument). 
 82. Whether the board should be free to depart from its initial determination based on 
newly discovered facts, that is, facts in existence at the time of that determination but not 
brought to the board’s attention, remains an open question. Courts typically defer to board 
decisions characterizing newly discovered evidence as changed circumstances. See infra 
Subsection III.C.3. 
 83. Cf. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 744 A.2d 1169, 1179–80 
(N.J. 2000) (holding that the board could not contradict its earlier findings that residential 
development of a residentially-zoned portion of the property was inappropriate; the court’s 
ultimate holding was that a supermarket chain did not need a new variance because its operation 
was covered by a prior variance granted to permit use of residentially-zoned land by a luxury 
department store). 
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was a relevant factor that was not before the board when it approved the 
initial variance. 
In sum, neither claim preclusion doctrine nor issue preclusion 
doctrine requires a zoning board to grant a variance merely because the 
board had previously granted a time-limited variance to the same 
landowner. Issue preclusion doctrine may limit the board’s power to 
reconsider discrete issues, but in light of the deference courts typically 
accord to board determinations, the limits imposed by issue preclusion 
doctrine rarely will operate as a significant constraint. 
2.  Variances and Special Permits Not Subject to  
Time Limitations 
Although the practice of placing time limits on variances and 
special permits has become common, it is not universal. When a 
landowner applies for a variance or special permit, and a zoning board 
approves the application without imposing any time constraints, it is 
reasonable to infer that the landowner will rely on the grant in a tangible 
way. Once the landowner starts to develop the land in reliance on the 
variance, vested-rights doctrine prevents the municipality from revoking 
the variance.84 But even if the landowner has not yet started 
development, most ordinances confer no power on the zoning board to 
undo a variance or special permit once granted. As a result, the 
landowner will not have to rely on preclusion doctrine. 
Tohr Industries v. Zoning Board of Appeals85 is illustrative. The 
landowner’s predecessor had obtained a variance in 1954 to construct a 
building for business use in a residential district. More than thirty years 
later, when the landowner sought to build a retail store on the site, the 
building commissioner objected and, on the commissioner’s petition, 
the zoning board revoked the variance. The New York Court of 
Appeals, however, reinstated the variance, observing that the prior 
board had not imposed any conditions on the variance, and concluding 
that the local ordinance did not confer power on the board to revoke a 
variance unless the landowner breached or violated a condition the 
board had previously imposed. 
3.  Collateral Consequences of Determinations  
Favorable to the Landowner 
Because a zoning board rarely has power to revoke a variance once 
granted, courts do not have to face a straightforward claim preclusion 
problem where the board faces two successive claims of entitlement to a 
                                                                                                                     
 84. For a general discussion of the vested rights doctrine, see Brian K. Steinwascher, 
Note, Statutory Development Rights: Why Implementing Vested Rights Through Statute Serves 
the Interests of the Developer and Government Alike, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 275–77 (2010). 
 85. 549 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1989). 
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variance.86 Instead, preclusion claims typically revolve around the effect 
of an earlier resolution of a discrete legal issue that would be 
determinative in a subsequent application. In this situation, courts apply 
issue preclusion principles and bind the board to its earlier 
determination—but only if prior resolution of the disputed issue leaves 
no discretion for the subsequent board. 
For instance, if neighbors challenge a determination that a building 
permit was properly issued, and the zoning board dismisses the 
challenge as untimely, the same board cannot later entertain a challenge 
to a certificate of occupancy subsequently issued for the use authorized 
by the building permit.87 Or, if in a referral to determine whether a 
landowner’s lots comply with the zoning ordinance, the zoning board 
interprets the ordinance to permit the landowner to include street beds in 
calculating the size of individual lots (obviating the need for an area 
variance), the board cannot later reject the landowner’s application that 
the street beds be included in calculating the total area of his lots for 
subdivision purposes.88 In each case, the board’s determination of a 
contested legal issue becomes binding on the board even if the context 
of the claim is somewhat different. 
B.  Preclusion Claims by Neighbors 
In an ordinary civil action for negligence or breach of contract, the 
defendant must appear in court to protect her interest. Appearance 
requires the expenditure of time and money (often including fees for 
legal representation). If the defendant proves successful in the litigation, 
claim preclusion doctrine protects the defendant against the possibility 
that the plaintiff will try again. 
                                                                                                                     
 86. On its face, Barber v. Weber, 715 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006), presents the 
most analogous situation. After landowners sought a determination that the zoning ordinance 
permitted their proposed use of the property, thus obviating the need for a conditional-use 
permit, the neighbors sought no judicial review. Id. at 685. Instead, three months after 
landowners began construction, the neighbors filed a separate action for an adjudication that the 
proposed use of the property violated the zoning ordinance. Id. The neighbors did not make the 
zoning board a party to the litigation. See id. The court dismissed their claim, relying on claim 
preclusion doctrine. Id. at 689. Barber is not, however, a case that pitted the landowners against 
the zoning board; it is clear that the zoning board would have supported the landowners’ 
position. As a practical matter, therefore, the case resembles those discussed infra in Section 
III.C, in which the board invokes preclusion principles. 
 87. See Palm Mgmt. Corp. v. Goldstein, 815 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674 (App. Div. 2006). 
Although the court in Palm Management used claim preclusion language, the challenge to the 
certificate of occupancy could not have been raised in the prior proceeding, because the 
certificate had not yet been issued at that time. The second challenge does not, therefore, fit 
neatly into the claim preclusion category. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the court would 
have reached the same result if the earlier board had dismissed the challenge to the building 
permit without considering the timeliness of the first challenge. Issue preclusion, by contrast, 
prevented the board from raising a ground—timeliness—that explicitly had been foreclosed by 
its decision in the prior proceeding. 
 88. See Waylonis v. Baum, 723 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (App. Div. 2001). 
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In many ways, the neighbors who oppose a landowner’s application 
for a variance or special permit resemble the defendant in civil 
litigation. The forum is different (a zoning board rather than a court of 
general jurisdiction), and the format of the proceedings may be 
different,89 but the neighbors’ objectives and options are similar to those 
of the defendant: in order to protect their interests, they must spend time 
and energy defending their position. One might expect, therefore, that if 
the neighbors prevail before the board, preclusion doctrine would 
protect them against subsequent variance and special permit 
applications by the same landowner. 
For a variety of reasons, claim preclusion doctrine does not—and 
should not—provide significant protection to neighbors. First, 
permitting a zoning board to consider a second application, even after a 
prior denial, has more potential to generate efficiency gains than 
typically will be the case in ordinary civil litigation. Second, it would 
cripple the decisionmaking process in land use cases to require a 
plaintiff to raise all legal theories and requests for relief in a single 
proceeding. Third, because a landowner unhappy with a board decision 
always can seek legislative relief in the form of a zoning amendment, 
the reliance interest of victorious neighbors is not nearly as strong as it 
would be in ordinary civil litigation. This Section explores these 
problems and demonstrates how they have led courts to reject claim 
preclusion arguments advanced by neighbors. 
1.  The Probability and Promise of Improved Decisionmaking 
Consider ordinary civil litigation—for instance, a claim for breach 
of contract or for wrongful death. If the plaintiff brings an action against 
the defendant and loses after a jury trial, why should the plaintiff be 
precluded from suing again, using the evidence the plaintiff gathered 
during the first action? The answer starts with litigation cost, both to 
decisionmakers and to the winning parties. Of course, permitting any 
litigation entails some cost, and we do not preclude a party from 
bringing a first action, because a judicial resolution generates social 
benefits that would be unavailable if the court refused to entertain the 
initial dispute. However, a cost-benefit analysis yields a much different 
result for a second, duplicative action: the costs associated with 
subsequent suits generate marginal, if any, likelihood of achieving 
“better” results.90 Because wrongful death and breach of contract are 
claims in which the merits are based on past events, all of the relevant 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Zoning boards typically are authorized to establish their own procedural guidelines for 
application hearings as to, inter alia, the presentment of evidence, use of expert witnesses, and 
presence of a stenographer. 23 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 (1993). 
 90. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 10 (1982) (“[F]inality attaches 
not because the courts are infallible but because they are inevitably fallible.”). 
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facts are at least theoretically available at the time of the first litigation. 
In time, lawyers and parties may uncover more information about the 
circumstances of the wrongful death or the contract breach, but the 
tendency of evidence at the first trial to degrade over time serves as a 
counterweight to the benefits of newly discovered evidence. Moreover, 
if the prospect of newly discovered evidence supports a second trial, 
why not a third? Logic provides no evident stopping point. 
The initial decision in a wrongful death action or a breach of 
contract action has serious consequences for both the plaintiff and the 
defendant: the winning party will be significantly better off than the 
losing party. But so long as the system provides each party with a fair 
opportunity to present its case, the social consequences of the decision 
are less clear. Although putting money in the plaintiff’s pocket will 
undoubtedly generate external effects different from those that would 
arise if the money stayed in the defendant’s pocket, there is no a priori 
reason to believe that one decision rather than the other will generate 
significant efficiency gains. 
There are, of course, exceptions to these general propositions. 
Sometimes, facts that arise after a tribunal renders its initial judgment 
will improve significantly the quality of an ultimate decision. And 
sometimes, the effects of a judgment are not merely distributional. 
Child custody cases illustrate both propositions. A custodial parent’s 
neglect after a court has rendered an initial custody determination sheds 
considerable light on the wisdom of the determination. The effects of 
the custody determination will be felt not only by the child, but also 
potentially by society at large. It should not be surprising, then, that 
claim preclusion doctrine does not prevent a court from revisiting 
custody determinations based on facts that arise after the initial custody 
determination.91 
With that background, consider a variance or special permit denial 
by a zoning board. The passage of time generates more information 
about the effect that new construction will have on the existing 
neighborhood. Suppose, for instance, that after the zoning board denied 
a use variance to permit multifamily construction, the local legislative 
body rezoned land in an abutting single-family district to permit 
multifamily construction. The rezoning might affect the returns the 
landowner would be able to obtain by building single-family homes and 
might also reduce the external effect of multifamily construction on 
neighboring sites. Applying claim preclusion doctrine to bar the 
landowner from seeking a new variance would freeze the parcel into a 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See, e.g., Lynch v. Horton, 692 S.E.2d 34, 37, 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 
mother’s forgery of a court order justified trial court in shifting custody from mother, who had 
prevailed in earlier custody determination, to father). 
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use that could well become inefficient.92 It should not be surprising, 
therefore, that courts seize upon changed circumstances like these in 
rejecting claim preclusion arguments advanced by neighbors.93 
2.  Efficient Claim Presentation 
Claim preclusion doctrine prevents plaintiffs from splitting claims 
and raising them in separate proceedings.94 Suppose the defendant 
borrows the plaintiff’s car, promising to return it. If the defendant fails 
to return the car, the plaintiff might be able to proceed against the 
defendant on multiple theories (conversion and breach of contract), and 
might be entitled to more than one remedy (money damages or 
injunctive relief).95 But if the plaintiff brings one action and loses, she 
cannot then bring another action advancing a different theory or seeking 
a different relief.96 The assumption behind these rules is that 
adjudication will generate better results, while imposing fewer burdens 
on parties and decisionmakers, if all potential remedies and theories for 
recovery are explored in a single proceeding. With land use 
applications, however, the efficiency calculus is somewhat different. 
a.  No Preclusion of Different Applications 
If the prohibition on splitting of claims were applied in the context 
of zoning and land use, a landowner seeking to develop a parcel of land 
would have to request from a zoning board all of the alternative forms 
of relief the landowner might want, and all of the theories for obtaining 
that relief within the board’s authoritative power. If the landowner 
omitted a theory or a remedy, claim preclusion doctrine would bar the 
landowner from seeking that remedy later. For instance, if a landowner 
sought a variance from setback requirements to permit construction of a 
residence, and the zoning board denied the variance, the landowner 
would be precluded from subsequently seeking a smaller variance from 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Cf. Springsteel v. Town of W. Orange, 373 A.2d 415, 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1977) (“To hold differently would offend public policy by countenancing a restraint upon the 
future exercise of municipal action in the absence of sound reason . . . .”). 
 93. See, e.g., Laurel Beach Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 785 A.2d 1169, 1177 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2001) (holding that a material change in zoning regulations prevents application of res 
judicata doctrine to bar subsequent application); Filanowski v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 266 
A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1970) (holding that a prior variance denial does not bind zoning board where 
rezoning neighboring land to permit apartments created new hardship to landowner). 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 24–25. 
 95. See id. § 24 cmt. b, illus. 3 & § 25 cmt. f (noting that parties may not bring successive 
actions for different remedies arising out of same transaction or connected series of 
transactions). 
 96. Id. § 24 cmt. c (“That a number of different legal theories casting liability on an actor 
may apply to a given episode does not create multiple transactions and hence multiple claims. 
This remains true although the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the 
facts, . . . or would call for different measures of liability or different kinds of relief.”). 
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the same setback requirements, because the landowner could have 
presented both requests in the same proceeding. 
Thus, in the zoning context, unlike the civil litigation context, a 
prohibition on splitting of claims would lead to inefficient 
decisionmaking. A landowner might be willing to build one of a dozen 
homes, each of which would require a variance, but the landowner has 
no intention of building all twelve. A rule prohibiting seriatim 
applications would require the landowner to present, and the board to 
evaluate, twelve separate plans, even though the landowner would never 
develop more than one.97 Moreover, the rule would stifle the give-and-
take that often accompanies a board’s denial of relief; the public hearing 
process often educates the landowner about community and zoning 
board objections and enables the landowner to present a new application 
that better accommodates those concerns.98 
When a litigant seeking relief cannot join claims in a single 
proceeding, ordinary claim preclusion policies do not apply. The 
comments to section 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments99 
                                                                                                                     
 97. The forms provided by municipalities to zoning applicants rarely give applicants the 
option to present alternative proposals. Applicants merely fill out the blank spaces on a form 
designed to describe a single zoning request. For example, a zoning application in Barnstable, 
Massachusetts provides in relevant part: 
 
Existing Level of Development of the Property - Number of Buildings: _________ 
Present Use(s): ________________________ Gross Floor Area: _____sq. ft. 
Proposed Gross Floor Area to be Added: ____ sq. ft., Altered: ____ sq. ft. 
 
Application for a Variance, TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, 2, http://www.town.barnstable.ma.us/ 
ZoningBoard/ZBA%20Variance%20Application.pdf (last visited May 12, 2011). 
Similarly, a zoning application in West Hempfield Township, Lancaster, Pennsylvania 
provides in relevant part: 
 
Proposed use and/or structures_______ 
Yards proposed: Front ______ ft. Rear _____ ft. Side _____ ft. 
Lot area ______ acres/sq. ft. Impervious coverage proposed______% 
Proposed structure: Width_____ Depth______ Height______ 
 
Zoning Permit Application, WEST HEMPFIELD TWP., 1, http://www.twp.west-hempfield.pa.us/ 
westhempfield/lib/westhempfield/zoning_application.pdf (last visited May 12, 2011). 
In addition, if landowners were required to present all plans at once and each plan were 
deemed a separate application, landowners might be required to pay multiple fees, which are not 
inconsiderable. For example, in Wayland, Massachusetts, the residential application fee is $150 
and the non-residential fee is $225. Zoning Board of Appeals Checklist, TOWN OF WAYLAND, 2, 
http://www.wayland.ma.us/Pages/WaylandMA_ZBA/ZONINGCHECKLSTrev.pdf (last visited 
May 12, 2011). In Cheshire, Connecticut, the residential application fee is $175 and the 
nonresidential fee is $300. Planning & Zoning Application Fee Schedule, TOWN OF CHESHIRE, 
http://www.cheshirect.org/planningzoning/pzapplicationfees.html (last visited May 12, 2011). 
 98. See Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in Making Land Use 
Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 293, 319 (2001/2002) (noting that public hearings 
generate a “‘give and take’ of ideas among interested parties [and] the ability to float 
compromise proposals”). 
 99. Section 24 provides, in relevant part, “[T]he claim extinguished includes all rights of 
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explain that equating “claim” with “transaction” is justified only when 
the litigants have sufficient procedural means by which to fully develop 
the claim in one action without being confined to a single type of 
relief.100 The modern judicial system provides such means: federal and 
state rules of civil procedure specifically state that a litigant may request 
different types of relief in one pleading.101 Zoning processes, which 
limit landowners to one type of relief per application, do not. 
Courts universally recognize this problem, but they do so implicitly. 
Typically, courts pay homage to the principle that res judicata doctrine 
applies to zoning determinations, but then carve out an exception for 
changed applications—an exception that could easily swallow the rule. 
The result is that neighbors may not rely on claim preclusion doctrine to 
prevent a zoning board from hearing a separate application for 
development on the same parcel. Hilltop Terrace Homeowner’s Ass’n v. 
Island County102 is illustrative. Seven months after the board of county 
commissioners denied a conditional-use permit to a cell phone provider 
seeking to build a tower in a rural residential zone, the board approved a 
new proposal for the same site, concluding that it was not bound by res 
judicata principles.103 In rejecting the neighbors’ challenge to the 
approval, the Washington Supreme Court agreed with the board, 
emphasizing that the second application “substituted a fundamentally 
different kind of structure, completely rerouted the access road to the 
site, significantly increased setbacks, and changed the number and kind 
of antennae.”104 Although the court indicated that res judicata principles 
apply to zoning applications, the court’s conclusion that “a second 
application may be considered if there is a substantial change in 
circumstances or conditions relevant to the application or a substantial 
change in the application itself”105 undermines its argument that claim 
preclusion principles apply. After all, in Hilltop Terrace itself, both 
proposals were for cell phone towers, and every feature of the approved 
application could have been placed before the board at the time of the 
                                                                                                                     
the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the 
transaction . . . out of which the action arose.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) 
(emphasis added). 
 100. Id. § 24 cmt. a (“A modern procedural system does furnish such means. It permits the 
presentation in the action of all material relevant to the transaction without artificial 
confinement to any single substantive theory or kind of relief and without regard to historical 
forms of action or distinctions between law and equity.”). 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3) (stating that a pleading must contain “a demand for the relief 
sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief”). States have 
adopted similar wording in their pleading rules. See, e.g., MASS. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (“Relief in the 
alternative or of several different types may be demanded.”); ME. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (same); OHIO 
R. CIV. P. 8(a) (same). 
 102. 891 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1995). 
 103. Id. at 33. 
 104. Id. at 35. 
 105. Id. 
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first application. 
Similarly, in Gunn v. Board of County Commissioners,106 a zoning 
board denied a landowner’s initial application to construct a softball 
field on premises operated as a private country club.107 The landowner 
submitted a second application two years later, having interchanged the 
proposed locations for home plate and the outfield.108 The zoning board 
granted a special permit, stating that the change reduced the noise and 
inconvenience to the neighboring homes.109 The Third District Court of 
Appeal of Florida rejected the neighbor’s claim of res judicata and held 
that the zoning ruling two years prior was not binding where a 
substantial change of circumstances occurred between the two 
applications.110 The court went on to explain that the authority to decide 
whether such a change had taken place “lies primarily within the 
discretion of the zoning authority itself,”111 and that by granting the 
second application, the board implicitly concluded that the repositioning 
of the field was a “meaningful alteration” of the previously rejected 
proposal.112 
As a Massachusetts appeals court recognized in Ranney v. Board of 
Appeals,113 giving a local permit-granting authority flexibility to 
consider multiple applications “offers the possibility of land use 
solutions sufficiently acceptable to the contending parties to keep the 
matter out of the courts.”114 That is, the developer may learn from a 
previous denial of a variance or special permit and develop a plan more 
acceptable to neighbors. The application of claim preclusion doctrine 
would foreclose that option. 
Courts have not ignored finality considerations in rejecting 
neighbors’ arguments that claim preclusion doctrine bars a landowner’s 
second application where the board denied the same landowner’s initial 
application. Rather, courts have often concluded that those concerns can 
                                                                                                                     
 106. 481 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 107. Id. at 96. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (citing Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co., 410 So. 2d 648, 651–54 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 111. Id. (citing City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1957)). 
 112. Id. Other cases concluding that neighbors may not invoke res judicata doctrine to 
overturn a board’s grant of an application significantly different from a previously denied 
application include Rocchi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 248 A.2d 922, 925 (Conn. 1968) 
(special exception applications), Hunt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 812 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 
(App. Div. 2006) (variance applications), Riina v. Baum, 754 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (App. Div. 
2002) (same), Peterson v. City Council, 574 P.2d 326, 331 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (same), and 
Wolfe v. Forbes, 217 S.E.2d 899, 902 (W. Va. 1975) (same). Cf. Anderson v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 217 P.3d 401, 408 (Wyo. 2009) (upholding grant of permit after previous denial 
without discussing res judicata or claim preclusion doctrine). 
 113. 414 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). 
 114. Id. at 376. The court noted, tongue-in-cheek, that “[t]he instant case illustrates that this 
advantage may be more theoretical than real.” Id. 
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best be addressed by deference to the zoning board; if the board decides 
the new application is sufficiently different to warrant reconsideration, 
the court should not second-guess that decision. As the New Jersey 
Supreme Court explained in sustaining the board’s decision to grant a 
variance after a previous denial of a somewhat different variance, “the 
question is not whether a reviewing court would have reached a 
different conclusion if it had initially decided the matter, but whether 
the Planning Board was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in 
concluding that [the] second application was sufficiently different to 
justify considering it on the merits.”115 
b.  No Preclusion of the Same Application when  
Applicant Produces New Information 
A fundamental concept of claim preclusion doctrine is that a court 
cannot rehear a claim simply because it incorrectly decided the initial 
action.116 Claim preclusion doctrine operates on the premise that, when 
faced with the same information, there is little reason to assume that a 
second decisionmaker will reach a better conclusion than the first. But 
suppose one or both of the parties offers more information to the second 
decisionmaker—that premise would no longer hold. Nevertheless, even 
if a litigant explains that the first determination was in error due to a 
litigant’s failure to fully educate the court about the important facts of 
the case, claim preclusion instructs that all related arguments, issues and 
evidence that could have been raised at the time of the initial claim are 
thereafter relinquished.117 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Bressman v. Gash, 621 A.2d 476, 481 (N.J. 1993) (citation omitted) (relying on its 
prior decision in Russell v. Board of Adjustment, 155 A.2d 83 (N.J. 1959)). For other cases 
holding that neighbors may not invoke res judicata or claim preclusion principles based on 
deference to a board’s determination that the previous and subsequent applications were 
materially different, see Ranney, 414 N.E.2d at 376 (citing Rocchi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 
248 A.2d 922, 925 (1968)) (“Whether the plans . . . have changed sufficiently to justify a 
reapplication . . . is principally for the local board to determine.”), Freeman v. Town of Ithaca 
Zoning Board of Appeals, 403 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (App. Div. 1978) (quoting Ellsworth Realty 
Co. v. Kramer, 49 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (App. Div. 1944)) (“[I]t is for the board to determine 
whether or not changed facts or circumstances are presented and, in so doing, it may give weight 
even ‘to slight differences which are not easily discernible.’”), and Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals, 129 A.2d 619, 621 (Conn. 1957). 
 116. See Bressman, 621 A.2d at 481; see also Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 
U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (citations omitted) (“Nor are the res judicata consequences of a final, 
unappealed judgment on the merits altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong 
or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.”); Bath Iron Works Corp. 
v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) (“But the point of 
[res judicata] is that the first determination is binding not because it is right but because it is 
first—and was reached after a full and fair opportunity between the parties to litigate the 
issue.”). 
 117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982) (“When a valid and final 
judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the rules of merger 
or bar . . . , the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the 
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The prohibition on raising new arguments and evidence is based on 
the perverse incentives a contrary rule would generate. If a party could 
obtain reconsideration by offering new evidence, then each party would 
have an incentive to withhold some evidence from the first proceeding, 
hoping to prevail anyway but knowing that the withheld evidence could 
help obtain a second chance at a favorable judgment. Precluding a 
rehearing in such instances creates appropriate incentives to come 
forward with all evidence and minimizes the chance a party will 
“discover” new evidence between the first and second proceedings. 
Although these same considerations are present in zoning and land 
use cases, courts seem to directly contravene these principles. To avoid 
the problem of “run[ning] afoul of the edicts of the doctrine of res 
judicata,”118 the courts classify the landowner’s submission of new 
evidence as a material change in circumstances, even if that evidence 
could have been presented at the time of the first proceeding. Consider 
Winchester v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc.119 The local zoning 
ordinance permitted construction of a helicopter landing pad as an 
accessory use to a hospital if the hospital obtained a conditional-use 
permit. At the initial public hearing on the hospital’s permit application, 
neighbors complained about noise and suggested alternative sites, 
leading the planning commission to deny the permit. Two months later, 
the commission granted the hospital’s second, virtually identical 
application for a conditional-use permit. When neighbors challenged the 
grant, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the challenge, holding 
that the commission was justified in reversing its first decision. The 
court noted that the initial rejection was based on the commission’s 
conclusion that a better site was available, but that the hospital’s 
introduction of additional evidence served to establish that there were, 
in fact, no better sites.120 
                                                                                                                     
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, 
out of which the action arose.”). Comment a to section 24 of the Restatement explains the 
rationale for precluding claims which might have been litigated: 
 
[Without such application], the plaintiff might be able to maintain another action 
based on a different theory, even though both actions were grounded upon the 
defendant’s identical act or connected acts forming a single life-situation. . . .  
  The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous with 
the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of 
relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff . . . . 
 
Id. § 24 cmt. a. 
 118. McDonald’s Corp. v. Twp. of Canton, 441 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
 119. 396 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
 120. Id. at 461; see also Vine v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 927 A.2d 958, 963–64 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2007) (citing Laurel Beach Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 785 A.2d 1169, 1174–75 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2001)) (holding that a board can reverse its decision based on information it did 
not have upon denying initial application); Bradley v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 609 A.2d 1043, 
1045 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (holding the same). Other courts have indicated in dictum that 
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Perhaps the disparity between the treatment of new information in 
zoning cases and in ordinary civil litigation is motivated by the 
longterm inefficient use of land that would be generated by “erroneous” 
decisions in zoning cases.121 Perhaps courts believe that zoning law 
provides other mechanisms to incentivize landowners to bring forth all 
pertinent information in the initial application. For instance, so long as 
the zoning board has discretion to conclude that new information is not 
significant enough to constitute a “material change in circumstances,” 
and can refuse to consider it, parties will still have incentives to produce 
all information upon the first application. And in some jurisdictions, 
time limits on reapplication will create a disincentive for withholding 
information.122 Whatever the reasons for the disparity, however, judicial 
treatment of new information in zoning cases is inconsistent with the 
tenets of claim preclusion doctrine. 
3.  The Availability of Legislative Relief and the  
Reliance Interest of Neighbors 
Preclusion doctrine rests in part on protecting the reliance interests 
of parties who have invested time and energy in successfully litigating a 
claim or defense. Neighbors who prevail before a zoning board could 
advance the same reliance arguments. The problem with the reliance 
argument in the zoning context is that no matter what happens before 
the zoning board, the local legislature is almost always free to change 
the ordinance to permit the landowner’s proposed use. Otherwise, a 
                                                                                                                     
emergence of new information would entitle a board to entertain a second application. See, e.g., 
Ranney v. Bd. of Appeals, 414 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (“To the extent that the 
board thought itself in error about underlying assumptions concerning the proposal, this 
constituted a change of circumstances which permitted the board to entertain a second 
application for zoning relief.”); McDonald’s Corp., 441 N.W.2d at 40–41 (concluding that new 
information submitted to the board in response to concerns expressed by the board in the 
original denial constituted change of circumstances). 
 121. In Winchester, for instance, had the court determined that claim preclusion barred the 
zoning board from reconsidering the hospital’s application, the zoning board’s error would have 
perpetuated a long-lasting inefficiency in the hospital’s distance from and accessibility to an 
offsite emergency helicopter launch pad. See 396 N.W.2d at 460–63. 
 122. See State ex rel. DeZeeuw v. Manitowoc Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, No. 91-0914, 478 
N.W.2d 596, 1991 WL 285894, at *2  (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 1991) (unpublished table 
decision) (per curiam) (citing local ordinance precluding applicant from bringing appeal to 
board based on same facts for a period of one year after initial rejection). In Winchester, by 
contrast, the Michigan court concluded that the local ordinance’s one-year bar on resubmission 
does not apply when the applicant brings new information before the commission. 396 N.W.2d 
at 460–62. Other courts have held that waiting periods like the one involved in Manitowoc and 
Winchester do not bar reapplication when landowner makes changes to the application, 
suggesting that the bar would apply when landowner brings the same application. See, e.g., 
Ranney, 414 N.E.2d at 376 (“It has always been supposed that if an application disclosed a 
project materially different from the one first introduced,” the statutory bar would not apply); 
Peterson v. City Council, 574 P.2d 326, 331 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that when second 
variance application was substantially different from prior application, ban on reapplication does 
not apply). 
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single administrative proceeding would forever prevent the municipality 
from changing land use policy. As a result, the neighbors do not have 
rights that “vest” once they prevail before the zoning board, 
undermining any assertions of a reliance interest.123 
A number of states impose judicial review on “legislative” 
determinations to rezone land. A few require the legislature to establish 
that the previous classification was a mistake or that there has been a 
significant change in circumstances that warrants a new classification. 
Others constrain the legislature by labeling the rezoning decision 
“quasi-judicial” and therefore subject to constraints not ordinarily 
imposed on legislative decisions. Even states that provide for judicial 
review of rezoning decisions, however, give the local legislature broad 
discretion to depart from its prior decisions. Consider Coral Reef 
Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co.124 A year and a half after denying the 
landowner’s application to rezone its property to permit residential use, 
the board of county commissioners approved a similar rezoning request. 
Although Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal indicated that 
administrative res judicata should apply to rezoning decisions, the court 
rejected the neighbors’ contention that the doctrine precluded the 
challenged rezoning. The court held that the applicability of res judicata 
doctrine is primarily within the administrative body’s province, and its 
determination “may only be overturned upon a showing of a complete 
absence of any justification therefor.”125 
4.  Issue Preclusion 
The preceding Subparts demonstrate that, despite judicial 
pronouncements about the applicability of claim preclusion or res 
judicata principles to zoning determinations, claim preclusion doctrine 
provides neighbors with virtually no protection. Public policy sensibly 
entitles zoning boards to consider changed applications and changed 
circumstances, leaving claim preclusion doctrine as a toothless 
constraint on zoning boards. We now turn briefly to issue preclusion 
principles. Issue preclusion binds a decisionmaker to honor a prior 
determination of an issue actually litigated and necessarily determined 
in a prior proceeding. These limitations make it difficult for neighbors 
to invoke issue preclusion doctrine. 
To obtain a variance, a landowner generally must establish several 
factors;126 the absence of any factor precludes grant of the variance. As 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See Bentley v. Valco, Inc., 741 P.2d 1266, 1269 (Colo. App. 1987) (citations omitted) 
(noting that authority of zoning board to reverse itself would be subject to vested rights 
limitation, but holding that adjacent landowners cannot acquire vested rights). 
 124. 410 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
 125. Id. at 655. 
126.  See, e.g., supra note 8. 
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a result, an express finding that one of the factors is missing is rarely 
necessary to the board’s determination, because the board’s denial could 
rest on the absence of any one of the factors. Russell v. Board of 
Adjustment127 exemplifies the problem. In denying the landowner a 
variance, the board concluded that the landowner had failed to prove 
that the variance could be granted without detriment to the public or 
impairment of the zoning plan and ordinance. A court sustained the 
board’s denial, also concluding that any hardship suffered by the 
landowner was self-created. A month after the judicial decision, the 
landowner applied for a new variance, and the neighbors contended that 
issue preclusion bound the board to the determination that any hardship 
was self-created.128 The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the issue 
preclusion defense on the ground that a finding of self-created hardship, 
even if binding, would not in itself bar relief on a new application.129 
Without deciding the issue, the court raised a more general question 
of greater importance: if the decisionmaker in the first proceeding has 
two or more grounds for a decision, is either ground binding in a 
subsequent case presenting a different claim?130 The Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments squarely answers that question: No.131 The 
reasoning offered in the Restatement is particularly important in the 
zoning setting: if each alternative ground were given issue preclusive 
effect, the losing party would have incentives to appeal the 
determination simply to protect himself against application of 
preclusion doctrine.132 In the zoning context, in other words, application 
of issue preclusion to a determination of “no hardship” would require a 
landowner who might otherwise apply for a new and less significant 
variance to first challenge the initial variance denial in court; failure to 
do so would preclude any subsequent application. This concern about 
encouraging litigation undoubtedly explains judicial reluctance to allow 
neighbors to invoke issue preclusion doctrine.133 
                                                                                                                     
 127. 155 A.2d 83 (N.J. 1959). 
 128. Id. at 88. 
 129. The court held that “[a] decision on self-created hardship, without more, is not 
conclusive on the determinative issue of undue hardship.” Id. at 89 (citation omitted). 
 130. Id. 
 131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982) (“If a judgment of a court 
of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently 
would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either 
issue standing alone.”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Cf. Laurel Beach Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 785 A.2d 1169, 1176 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2001) (noting that a determinative issue in a second proceeding was not key to prior 
determination); Petrillo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 841 N.E.2d 266, 272 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) 
(noting that a determinative issue in a second proceeding was neither essential to the decision of, 
nor actually litigated in, a prior proceeding). 
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5.  Interpretations 
Applications for variances, special permits, and subdivisions all 
require the zoning board or other administrative body to apply an 
ordinance’s legal standards to a set of facts that include the composition 
of the existing neighborhood and the details of the landowner’s 
application. Because the facts change with subsequent applications, 
preclusion doctrines are of little assistance to neighbors. The situation is 
different when a landowner seeks an interpretation of the zoning 
ordinance. The board’s decision on an interpretation is not generally 
subject to the same kind of change, and neighbors may, therefore, 
prevent the board from issuing a subsequent and contrary interpretation 
to the same landowner. 
Cosby v. Board of Zoning Appeals134 furnishes an example. As part 
of a landowner’s application for a special exception, the planning 
commission sought an opinion about whether a proposed rock crusher 
would be a nonconforming use. The Board of Zoning Appeals 
concluded that it would be nonconforming, and a court affirmed. On 
those facts, the court concluded that no changed circumstances could 
exist and that a subsequent board (and subsequent court) was bound by  
res judicata doctrine. 
C.  Preclusion Claims by Zoning Boards of Appeals 
The preceding Section established that claim preclusion doctrine 
does not bind a zoning board to its prior determinations on applications 
for variances and special permits; courts almost universally permit 
zoning boards to entertain repeat applications. This subordination of 
finality concerns reflects several realities about the land use process. A 
second determination may generate long-term efficiency gains where 
changes in the proposed land use or the neighborhood’s circumstances 
suggest that the first determination was “wrong.” Requiring landowners 
to apply for multiple and inconsistent forms of relief upon an initial 
application would be both costly and inefficient. Moreover, the 
availability of legislative relief for a disappointed landowner limits the 
reliance interests of victorious neighbors. These realities lead courts to 
acquiesce in zoning board decisions to rehear previously decided 
applications. 
Suppose, however, a zoning board invokes preclusion doctrine to 
avoid hearing a new application from a landowner whose earlier 
application for a variance or a special permit was unsuccessful. If claim 
preclusion doctrine does not bar reconsideration of an application, 
should due process of law require the board to decide each new 
application on the merits? The nearly universal judicial answer is no. 
                                                                                                                     
 134. 7 Va. Cir. 253 (1985). 
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That answer makes practical sense. In many cases, circumstances 
have not changed significantly since the board denied the landowner’s 
first application, the two applications are substantially similar (or nearly 
identical), and any new evidence or arguments advanced by the 
landowner easily could have been anticipated at the time of the first 
application. In these circumstances, requiring a new hearing on the 
merits would generate no efficiency gains to compensate for the 
efficiency and fairness concerns that lie behind finality doctrines. 
On each of these issues—the significance of any change in external 
circumstances, the similarity of the two applications, and the relevance 
of new evidence (and its availability at the time of the first hearing)—
the zoning board has more experience and more expertise than a 
reviewing court. Just as courts typically defer to other zoning board 
decisions within areas of board expertise,135 courts defer to board 
determinations that denial of a landowner’s prior application precludes a 
different decision on a subsequent application. As in other areas of land 
use law, however, deference does not mean abdication. Courts do 
engage in a form of rational basis review. Most critically, preclusion 
principles do not permit a board to deny a subsequent application 
without hearing the applicant’s claim that circumstances have changed 
since the prior application. The cases can best be understood as a 
combination of issue preclusion and deference principles: issue 
preclusion principles bind the applicant to the board’s prior 
determination with respect to issues actually litigated and necessarily 
determined, while deference principles limit the willingness of courts to 
second-guess the board’s decision that there were no changes in the 
circumstances or the application to make the current issue different 
from the one resolved in the prior proceeding. 
1.  Change of Circumstances Cases 
Suppose a zoning board denies a variance to a landowner who 
wants to erect a multiple-unit apartment building on a parcel of land 
zoned for a single-family dwelling. One year later, the same landowner 
reapplies for the same use variance, citing changes in the neighborhood 
including the construction of an apartment complex two blocks away. 
According to the landowner, this change has had such a significant 
impact on the character of the community that his claim of unnecessary 
hardship is much stronger and warrants reconsideration. If the zoning 
board disagrees and summarily denies the second application, will a 
court overturn the board’s determination? 
A court generally does not exercise its independent judgment to 
                                                                                                                     
 135. See, e.g., Retail Prop. Trust v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 774 N.E.2d 727, 731 (N.Y. 
2002) (noting that deference to the board is appropriate on a “fact-specific choice of the kind 
that local boards are uniquely suited to make”). 
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determine whether a landowner’s repeat application is different enough 
to warrant reconsideration.136 Instead, courts defer to the zoning board’s 
determination that no material facts have changed. In reaching this 
outcome, courts, often implicitly, employ a two-step process. First, the 
court applies issue preclusion to all issues fully litigated and necessarily 
decided in the initial application. Second, the court defers to the zoning 
board’s determination that the two applications are so similar as to bar 
reconsideration of the subsequent application. 
Deference to the zoning board’s assessment of changed 
circumstances is so well-established that many of the opinions 
upholding a zoning board’s invocation of res judicata do not even 
discuss the facts of the two applications; rather, they summarily assert 
that the board was within its discretion to find no material changes had 
occurred.137 Courts recognize that just as the board is in the best 
position to determine that a new application is sufficiently different to 
warrant reconsideration,138 it is also in the best position to decide that 
changed facts are not significant enough to constitute a material change. 
This practice is consistent with the goal of efficient decisionmaking 
in land use applications. There is nothing to be gained from requiring 
the zoning board to reconsider an application based on the occurrence of 
an inconsequential change, when the board inevitably will reject the 
application for the same reasons as the initial denial. Returning to the 
hypothetical, the construction of an apartment complex two blocks 
away from the subject site indisputably altered the total mix of 
information available to the zoning board. Nevertheless, the board was 
best situated, practically, to determine whether the change would 
influence its decision in any way. As a result, a court would uphold the 
board’s exercise of discretion to deny the second variance application 
without a full rehearing on the merits. 139 
                                                                                                                     
 136. See, e.g., Barlow v. Planning Bd., 832 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Zoning Bd., 754 N.E.2d 101, 106 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Even if the record reveals that a desired special 
permit could lawfully be granted by the board because the applicant’s evidence satisfied the 
statutory and regulatory criteria, the board retains discretionary authority to deny the permit . . . , 
so long as that denial is not based upon a legally untenable or arbitrary and capricious ground.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Miller v. Booth, 702 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“In the 
instant case, we find that the Board of County Commissioners acted within its discretion when it 
determined that a substantial change in circumstances had not occurred . . . .”); Hasam Realty 
Corp. v. Dade Cnty., 486 So. 2d. 9, 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he commission could 
properly have found, in its discretion, that there were no significant differences as to the vital 
issues of density, traffic, and the like, between the instant application and one which had been 
previously rejected . . . .”); Pettit v. Bd. of Appeals, 554 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (App. Div. 1990) 
(citations omitted) (“At bar, the Board’s finding that there were ‘no material differences’ 
between [the landowner’s] proposed application and [the previous landowner’s] prior 
application . . . ‘was clearly not arbitrary’ or an abuse of discretion . . . .”). 
 138. See supra Subsection III.B.2.a. 
 139. Similarly, in Calapai v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 871 N.Y.S.2d 288 (App. Div. 
2008), the zoning board had granted the landowner a variance to temporarily convert her garage 
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The principle that courts defer to zoning board determinations that 
conditions have not changed is subject to two qualifications. First, the 
zoning board must hold a hearing to determine whether material 
changes have occurred.140 Second, when the board’s conclusion that 
circumstances have not changed is arbitrary, courts may intervene to 
require a rehearing. 
First, consider the board’s procedural obligation. Statutes generally 
require a zoning board to hold a hearing on an application for a variance 
or a special permit.141 Once a board holds a hearing and makes a 
decision, issue preclusion prevents relitigation of the issues actually and 
necessarily decided. But issue preclusion doctrine always affords a 
litigant a hearing to argue that particular issues were not actually or 
necessarily decided. When a landowner applicant argues that 
circumstances have changed since the prior decision, the landowner is 
effectively arguing that the issues in the second proceeding were not 
actually or necessarily determined in the first hearing. The applicant is 
right if circumstances have changed, but wrong if circumstances have 
not changed. The board, therefore, must hold a hearing on that critical 
issue: whether circumstances have changed.142 
Thus, in Kreisberg v. Scheyer,143 the court refused to defer to the 
arbitrary action of the zoning board in rejecting a landowner’s petition 
for an area variance solely on the grounds that twenty years prior, a 
                                                                                                                     
into a bedroom for her paraplegic son, with the condition that she restore the property to its 
original use as a garage if a change in circumstances should occur. Id. at 289. After her son’s 
death, the board granted her a three-year extension of the variance, renewable at the board’s 
discretion, but refused to abrogate the restriction entirely as the landowner requested. Id. at 289–
90. In upholding the board’s determination that no material change of circumstances had 
occurred to warrant consideration of the landowner’s petition, the New York appellate court 
reasoned that the only change in circumstance—her son’s death—was not unanticipated and was 
taken into consideration by the board in its previous decision. Id. at 290. 
 140. See Rhema Christian Ctr. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189, 194 (D.C. 
1986) (“[S]ummary disposition is not an option unless the second application is identical to the 
first and no change of circumstances is alleged.”); Stoneback v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 699 A.2d 
824, 827 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (“Generally, the Board is required to provide an applicant an 
opportunity to present evidence of an alleged substantial change in conditions or circumstances 
related to the land itself before determining whether res judicata is applicable.”). 
 141. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2310 (2011) (requiring hearing on applications for 
special exceptions and variances). 
 142. Of course, if a landowner-applicant does not attempt to show a change in 
circumstances, the zoning board is within its discretion to summarily deny the second 
application without a hearing. See Burger King Corp. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 349 So. 2d 210, 
211–12 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding a zoning board’s rejection of Burger King’s 
variance application to use professional office space as a restaurant on the ground of res 
judicata, where the board previously rejected a predecessor-in-interest’s similar application and 
Burger King did not attempt to show changed circumstances); Metro. Dade Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (upholding the 
zoning board’s invocation of res judicata where the landowner did not attempt to show a change 
in circumstances since the denial of the landowner’s similar application one year prior for a 
special exception to enlarge a building and a variance to operate a nightclub). 
 143. 808 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 2006). 
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different landowner had submitted a variance application with 
dissimilar setback proposals and size dimensions.144 The court 
remanded the application, requiring the zoning board to hold a hearing 
on whether circumstances had changed between the two applications. 
The second limitation on a board’s application of res judicata 
doctrine is substantive rather than procedural. Courts will not defer to 
an “arbitrary and capricious” zoning board determination that 
circumstances have not changed.145 Moore v. Town of Islip Zoning 
Board of Appeals146 illustrates the point. The zoning board refused to 
hear a landowner’s application for an area variance based on a prior 
owner’s failed area variance application approximately twenty years 
earlier, stating that no change of circumstances had occurred. Although 
the trial court upheld the zoning board’s determination, a New York 
appellate court reversed, emphasizing the time gap between the two 
applications.147 The court held that it was arbitrary and capricious to 
find that the character and conditions in the neighborhood had not 
materially changed since the initial application.148 
2.  Change of Application Cases 
Suppose that a zoning board rejects a landowner’s application for a 
variance to build a twenty-unit apartment complex with a parking lot on 
the east side of the property, adjacent to a daycare center. In rejecting 
the proposal, the board states that the location of the parking lot presents 
an unacceptable safety hazard for the children in the daycare center. Of 
what effect is the board’s denial if the landowner reapplies for a 
variance to erect a ten-unit complex with a parking lot in the same 
location? Would the board be entitled to reject the application without 
considering the merits anew? 
The answer is and should be yes. Issue preclusion allows a zoning 
board to dismiss a subsequent application that does not address a defect 
relied upon by the board in denying the prior application. In the given 
hypothetical, the landowner changed the lot density, but failed to 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Id. at 890–92. 
 145. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 217 P.3d 401, 405 (Wyo. 2009) (“We 
continue to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard as a ‘safety net’ designed to ‘catch 
agency action which prejudices a party’s substantial rights . . . .’”). 
There is no precise formula for what a court will deem arbitrary and capricious behavior in 
the land use context, but case law suggests that it is only in the most extreme circumstances that 
the courts will interfere with the discretion of the zoning board and overturn a board’s 
determination of res judicata. Courts are more likely to deem the zoning board’s refusal to hear 
a landowner’s application arbitrary when the denial is based on a previous application that was 
brought (1) by a different landowner, (2) decades earlier, (3) with different proposed details in 
the application. 
 146. 813 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div. 2006). 
 147. Id. at 543. 
 148. Id. 
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alleviate the board’s objection to the hazardous location of the parking 
lot. Therefore, issue preclusion would permit the board to reject the 
subsequent application as not materially different from the prior 
application.149 
On the other hand, if a subsequent application does not raise the 
issue that led the board to deny the initial application, the board cannot 
rely on issue preclusion to reject the new application. As already 
noted,150 efficiency concerns mandate that an applicant not be required 
to offer, in a single application, every possible alternative development 
plan when the landowner wants to develop only one of those plans. As a 
result, the process of applying for special permits, site plan approval, 
and even variances, necessarily involves a dialogue between the 
landowner and the administrative body in which each side educates the 
other about its concerns. If denial of one application precluded a 
landowner from subsequently submitting an application that resolved 
the issue that led to the first denial, the landowner would never be able 
to respond to the reasons articulated by the board for rejecting the 
earlier application. For that reason, prior board determinations are 
entitled only to issue preclusion, not claim preclusion effect. 
Courts will defer to the zoning board’s determination that its 
articulated reasons for rejecting the initial application are dispositive in 
the subsequent request for relief. That is, if the board concludes that 
changes in the new application do not address the reasons for the earlier 
rejection, then the board can invoke preclusion doctrine to decline full 
consideration of the new application. As with any matter of issue 
preclusion, the board at least must afford the applicant landowner a 
hearing to determine whether the subsequent application is sufficiently 
different to warrant reconsideration.151 
The following scenarios illustrate the point. First, consider an easy 
case. Suppose that a zoning board denies a use variance application on 
the ground that the landowner failed to show the land could not generate 
a reasonable return as presently zoned.152 Issue preclusion binds the 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Indeed, issue preclusion doctrine might not merely allow, but rather require, the board 
to deny the subsequent application, because the board actually and necessarily determined that 
the parking lot created an unacceptable safety hazard. On the other hand, the board might 
conclude that with only ten units, the risks associated with the parking lot are more tolerable 
than with twenty units. 
 150. See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
 151. If the zoning board determines that a subsequent application is significantly different, 
the board can no longer rely on issue preclusion to reject the application and is required to 
consider the application on the merits. Cf. Hurley v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 893 N.Y.S.2d 277, 
278–79  (App. Div. 2010). 
 152. The most commonly embraced test for a use variance was set forth in the seminal case 
of Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1939). The landowner: 
must show that (1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used 
only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to 
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board to this determination, even if a subsequent application changes 
the requested use entirely, because the initial determination established 
that the subject parcel did not meet one of the essential elements to 
qualify for a use variance.153 
Now suppose that a zoning board rejects a subdivision application to 
convert a parcel of land into eighteen single-family lots due to the 
inadequacy of the access road in the plan.154 Four years later, the 
landowner reapplies to the zoning board having increased the density 
from eighteen to twenty-five lots and enlarged the open space area, but 
still requesting to use the same access road that the board had 
previously rejected.155 Even though the application has undoubtedly 
changed in several aspects since the board’s initial denial, the 
landowner has failed to obviate the board’s objections to the access 
road. The changes are not material in light of the reasons for the board’s 
initial denial. The previously rejected application is thus dispositive, and 
the board need not consider the subsequent application on the merits. 
In contrast, if a new application is materially different and the 
defects that led to the initial denial are cured or irrelevant to the 
subsequent application, the zoning board cannot invoke issue preclusion 
to refuse to consider the application.156 Grasso v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals157 is instructive. The landowner applied for a zoning permit and 
coastal site plan approval to install a concrete support in his shoreline 
property to prevent erosion. The board denied the application, citing the 
landowner’s lack of compliance with certain statutory and regulatory 
provisions. Two years later, the landowner submitted a second 
application that he claimed addressed the defects of his first application. 
In remanding the matter to the zoning board, the Connecticut Appellate 
Court held that the board was required to hold a hearing to consider 
whether the application in fact corrected the initial application’s 
                                                                                                                     
unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood 
which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) 
that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character 
of the locality. 
 Id. at 853 (emphasis added). 
 153. Cf. id. 
 154. These facts are those of Davidson v. Kitsap County, 937 P.2d 1309, 1311–12 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1997). 
 155. Id. at 1312. 
 156. For example, in Josato, Inc. v. Wright, 733 N.Y.S.2d 214 (App. Div. 2001), the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York found res judicata inapplicable and 
required the zoning board to consider the merits of the landowner’s use variance application 
where the previous petition was made by a different applicant, involved different proposals for 
constructing houses on the property, and was prior to the amendment of the Town Law. Id. at 
215. 
 157. 794 A.2d 1016 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
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deficiencies.158 If the defects were addressed, the zoning board would 
be required to consider the application on its merits. 
3.  Identical Applications/New Evidence Cases 
Suppose that a landowner, having been previously denied a use 
variance, reapplies for an identical variance, arguing that she has 
gathered additional evidence to support her claim of unique hardship to 
her parcel of land. As discussed earlier,159 a court would likely permit a 
zoning board to consider the landowner’s repeat application, 
characterizing the new evidence as a “material change in 
circumstances.” However, would a court also uphold a zoning board’s 
decision to summarily refuse to hear the new evidence? 
The answer is yes. When a zoning board declines to hear new 
evidence, courts invariably defer to the board’s determination 
(provided, of course, that the board abided by proper procedures).160 
This is consistent with ordinary issue preclusion principles, which bar 
an unsuccessful litigant from making a duplicative request for relief—to 
the extent the issue has been fully and necessarily determined—on the 
sole basis of additional evidence. 
Even when a zoning board permits submission of additional 
evidence, the board is still within its discretion to find that the new 
information does not constitute a material change in circumstance to 
overcome issue preclusion. Consider Jensen v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals.161 Two years after the zoning board denied a landowner’s 
request for an area variance to build a single-family residence on his lot, 
the landowner reapplied for an identical variance. The landowner 
presented evidence in the second hearing that the value of the lot with 
the variance increased threefold.162 The New York appellate court 
upheld the zoning board’s rejection of the second application, asserting 
that only “the quality of his proof, not . . . the facts themselves[,] had 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 1027–28 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The fact that a 
prior site plan did not comply does not allow the zoning commission to turn down one which 
does.”). 
 159. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b. 
 160. For instance, Palmieri Cove Associates v. New Haven Zoning Board of Appeals, No. 
CV054013158S, 2008 WL 2930238 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 3, 2008), illustrates the deference 
courts accord to board determinations. A landowner submitted a duplicative use variance 
application to utilize his property as a slip marina, after having been rejected one year earlier. 
The landowner attempted to submit new evidence in the form of an affidavit from the previous 
landowner “that it was never her intention to abandon the use of the property as a marina.” Id. at 
*1 (internal quotation marks omitted). The board refused to consider the new information, 
invoking res judicata as to the previously rejected application. The Superior Court of 
Connecticut upheld the board’s rejection of the new evidence, deferring to the board’s 
determination that no material change of circumstances had occurred. Id. at *3. 
 161. 515 N.Y.S.2d 283 (App. Div. 1987). 
 162. Id. at 284–85. 
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changed.”163 
This case stands in some contrast to those that uphold zoning board 
decisions to reconsider identical applications based solely on the 
introduction of new information.164 In both instances, however, courts 
defer to the zoning board’s determination about whether to reconsider 
its decision in light of additional information.165 This deference reflects 
the informational advantages enjoyed by the zoning board—both with 
respect to the factors that led to its prior determination and with respect 
to the longterm inefficiencies that would be generated by an “incorrect” 
zoning board decision. 
Recall that zoning boards may not summarily reject a new 
application that is materially different from the initial relief requested or 
that cures defects which led to the initial denial. This is because the 
give-and-take process between a landowner and a zoning board is 
significantly more efficient than requiring an applicant to bring forth all 
possible requests for relief in the initial application. In contrast, a zoning 
board may summarily reject an identical application in which the only 
purported “change” is additional evidence, because there are no 
efficiency advantages in permitting a landowner to submit the same 
application multiple times, altered only by different supporting 
evidence. 
D.  The Impact of Statutes and Judicial Decisions  
on the Power to Reconsider 
The focus of this Article so far has been on the res judicata effect a 
board decision has on the same board in a subsequent proceeding. But 
local land use boards are creatures of statute, and statutes have the 
capacity to override the principles that would otherwise apply. 
Moreover, board decisions are subject to judicial review, and one might 
surmise that a judicial decision affirming (or reversing) a board decision 
would have res judicata consequences different from those that would 
                                                                                                                     
 163. Id. at 285. 
 164. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b. 
 165. Notably, in Jensen, the landowner unsuccessfully had appealed the board’s original 
denial of the identical application. Thus, the landowner had the opportunity to diligently bring 
forth all of his evidence not only at the initial zoning board hearing, but also at the judicial 
proceeding, in which he likely had the assistance of legal counsel. The court refused to require 
the zoning board to consider the new evidence to be a material change of circumstance where 
the landowner failed to avail himself of multiple opportunities to show the augmented value of 
the property with a variance. 515 N.Y.S.2d at 284–85. 
The case is harder when an initial variance application is not appealed, and there is no 
judicial proceeding or legal counsel to impress upon the landowner the importance of 
thoroughly presenting all relevant evidence in existence at the time. It is more likely, in such a 
scenario, that the landowner imprudently failed to gather all significant evidence under the 
mistaken assumption that he could reapply later and assemble more persuasive information. 
Nevertheless, a zoning board still is entitled to invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion and reject 
a landowner’s duplicative application based solely on new evidence. 
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flow from the board decision itself. This Subsection explores those 
issues. 
1.  Statutory Directives 
Because res judicata is a common law doctrine, its command must 
yield to statutory directives that limit or expand the doctrine’s scope. No 
states appear to have enacted statutes that explicitly address the res 
judicata effect of zoning board determinations, but a number of statutes 
and ordinances prohibit reconsideration of an application for a specified 
period of time. A broad reading of these statutes implicitly would limit 
the scope of res judicata doctrine. 
The Massachusetts statute illustrates this problem. The statute 
provides, in essence, that once an application has been disapproved, the 
permit-granting authority shall not approve the application within two 
years unless a supermajority finds that there has been a material change 
in circumstances and all but one member of the planning board 
consents.166 This statute raises two potential conflicts with res judicata 
doctrine. First, suppose a landowner alters his application for a special 
permit or variance and submits the amended application before the end 
of the two-year period. Does the statute preclude application of res 
judicata doctrine because the statute provides the exclusive remedy for 
reapplications during the two-year period? Second, suppose a 
landowner resubmits her original application more than two years after 
the board denied that application. Does the statute implicitly require the 
board to consider the resubmitted application on the merits, preventing 
any application of res judicata doctrine after the expiration of the two-
year period? Other statutes and ordinances raise similar issues.167 
                                                                                                                     
 166. The relevant portion of the statute provides: 
No appeal, application or petition which has been unfavorably and finally acted 
upon by the special permit granting or permit granting authority shall be acted 
favorably upon within two years after the date of final unfavorable action 
unless said special permit granting authority or permit granting authority finds, 
by a unanimous vote of a board of three members or by a vote of four members 
of a board of five members or two-thirds vote of a board of more than five 
members, specific and material changes in the conditions upon which the 
previous unfavorable action was based, and describes such changes in the 
record of its proceedings, and unless all but one of the members of the planning 
board consents thereto and after notice is given to parties in interest of the time 
and place of the proceedings when the question of such consent will be 
considered. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 16 (West 2010). 
 167. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-6 (West 2010). For cases construing ordinances 
that specify time limits for reapplication, see, for example, Rhema Christian Center v. District of 
Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189, 195–96 (D.C. 1986), and Moulton v. 
Board of Zoning Appeals, 555 N.W.2d 39, 45–46 (Neb. 1996). 
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The authority is clear on the first issue. Even if a statute purports to 
bar reapplication for a specified period, courts do not construe the bar to 
prevent reconsideration when the applicant can show either that the 
application itself is different or that the circumstances surrounding the 
application have changed. For instance, in Ranney v. Board of Appeals, 
a Massachusetts appeals court held that the statutory ban did not bar a 
new special permit application materially different from an application 
rejected by the same board less than a month earlier.168 The court 
explicitly indicated that courts should defer to a board’s determination 
that the circumstances surrounding the new application are materially 
different from those at issue in the first application.169 
The second, more difficult issue is whether a time-limited ban on 
reapplications effectively requires boards to reconsider reapplications 
on the merits once the statutory time period has expired, implicitly 
displacing preclusion doctrine. Start with the premise that a statute like 
the Massachusetts statute must have been designed to have some 
application. Issue preclusion doctrine would (even absent the statute) 
prevent a board from considering identical applications before 
expiration of the statutory ban. The statute does not purport to prevent a 
board from considering different applications or changed circumstances, 
either before or after the expiration of the ban. One might argue, 
therefore, that for the statute to have any effect, the statute should be 
read to require a board to consider, on the merits, an application 
identical to one already rejected, so long as the second application is 
made after expiration of the statutory time period. 
Although the case law is sparse, at least one court has held that a 
board must consider a nearly identical application after expiration of the 
statutory time period. In Moulton v. Board of Zoning Appeals,170 the 
Nebraska Supreme Court held that a provision in the Lincoln Municipal 
Code prohibiting applications for “substantially similar variance[s] . . . 
within one year” prevented the board from invoking res judicata after 
expiration of the one year period.171  
Other courts have suggested the opposite conclusion—that res 
judicata doctrine continues to apply despite enactment of a statutory 
time limit.172 The concern that prompts statutory time limits is 
                                                                                                                     
 168. 414 N.E.2d 373, 374–75 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). Other cases reaching similar 
conclusions in other states include Winchester v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc., 396 
N.W.2d 456, 462 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), and Peterson v. City Council, 574 P.2d 326, 330–31 
(Or. Ct. App. 1978). 
 169. Ranney, 414 N.E.2d at 376. 
 170. 555 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1996). 
 171. Id. at 45–46. Of course, it is clear that a board would be entitled to consider an 
application anew after expiration of the period. See State ex rel. DeZeeuw v. Manitowoc Cnty. 
Bd. of Adjustment, No. 91-0914, 478 N.W.2d 596, 1991 WL 285894, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 
20, 1991) (per curiam). 
 172. Rhema Christian Ctr., 515 A.2d at 196; Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co., 
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undoubtedly the same one that underlies judicial development of 
preclusion doctrine: protecting zoning boards against repetitious 
applications  while preserving flexibility to adapt to circumstances that 
change over time. Indeed, some statutes make that clear by providing 
only that no board “shall be required” to hear a new application within 
the statutory period, impliedly giving a board the discretion to apply res 
judicata doctrine.173 Moulton, then, may be an outlier; most courts 
appear unlikely to treat these statutes as undermining ordinary res 
judicata principles. 
Other statutory provisions regulate “rehearings” of an application 
without making it clear how, if at all, a rehearing is different from a 
new, but substantially similar, application. These statutes, which often 
make no reference to the time frame for a rehearing, typically have no 
impact on preclusion doctrine. For instance, New York statutes 
authorize a zoning board to rehear an application upon a unanimous 
vote of the board.174 Statutes like this one, which impose procedural 
hurdles before a board may rehear an application, do not undermine 
preclusion doctrine except in the limited circumstances where the 
applicant surmounts those high procedural hurdles. 
2.  Prior Judicial Decisions 
How does judicial review of a prior board decision affect the 
application of preclusion principles? Unlike a prior unreviewed board 
determination, a judicial decision carries with it an important aspect of 
claim preclusion doctrine: the determination bars not only relitigation of 
the issue actually and necessarily determined in the first judicial 
proceeding (the usual issue preclusion effect), but also relitigation of all 
claims and issues the aggrieved party could have raised in that earlier 
proceeding. 
Freddolino v. Village of Warwick Zoning Board of Appeals175 
illustrates the point. The landowner sought an area variance from a 
zoning requirement limiting total development coverage to forty percent 
                                                                                                                     
410 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Marks v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 203 A.2d 
761, 763–64 (R.I. 1964). Note, however, that only in Marks was the court’s conclusion 
necessary to the resolution of the case. See id. at 764. In Coral Reef, the court’s ultimate 
conclusion was that the board was entitled to entertain a subsequent application, 410 So. 2d at 
655, and in Rhema the court refrained from “imposing [its] own construction of the regulation” 
pending an interpretation from the board. 515 A.2d at 196. 
 173. See Root v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 565 A.2d 14, 16 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (citation 
omitted). 
 174. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(12) (McKinney 2011); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-a(12) 
(McKinney 2011). New York courts, however, have construed the statute to require presentation 
of new facts. Freddolino v. Vill. of Warwick Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 596 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492  
(App. Div. 1993); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 677:2 (2011) (authorizing rehearing within 
thirty days if, in the board’s opinion, “good reason therefor is stated in the motion”). 
 175. 596 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 1993). 
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of the total square footage of the landowner’s parcel. When the zoning 
board denied the variance, the landowner sought judicial review, 
contending that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. Four months 
after the court dismissed the landowner’s petition, he applied for the 
same variance, introducing expert testimony to support a claim of 
hardship. When the board again denied the variance, concluding that the 
landowner had not demonstrated any change in circumstances, the 
applicant again sought judicial review, this time adding constitutional 
claims to the claim that the denial was arbitrary and capricious.176 In 
dismissing the constitutional claims, the court observed that those 
claims could have been raised in the initial proceeding, and that res 
judicata principles precluded the landowner from raising them in the 
second proceeding.177 
If the landowner in Freddolino had not sought judicial review of the 
board’s first denial, issue preclusion principles would not have barred 
the landowner from advancing the constitutional attack after the second 
denial. The zoning board itself would not have been equipped to 
consider the constitutional challenge, and from the standpoint of judicial 
economy, there would be little reason to require the landowner to bring 
a judicial challenge to the initial determination when the landowner still 
hoped that the board would approve some version of the project once 
educated by supplementary materials. After the board’s rejection of a 
subsequent application, therefore, he would have been entitled to bring 
the constitutional claim. But because the landowner actually challenged 
the first determination in court, the judicial economy calculus was 
significantly different; there was every reason for the court to insist that 
the landowner raise all judicially cognizable claims in the same 
proceeding—the usual claim preclusion rule. 
On the other hand, a judicial decision upholding a variance or 
special permit denial does not preclude the zoning board from granting 
a landowner’s subsequent application when either the circumstances or 
the substance of the landowner’s application have changed.178 In this 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. at 491–92. The landowner argued that the forty percent limit was unconstitutional 
on its face and as applied.  Id. at 492. 
 177. Id. at 492–93. The court acknowledged that as a matter of New York procedure, the 
landowner would have had to convert the challenge to the board’s action to a declaratory 
judgment proceeding in order to raise the constitutional claim, but observed that there was no 
impediment to such a conversion. Id. at 492. 
 178. Indeed, in In re Clute v. Town of Wilton Zoning Board of Appeals, 611 N.Y.S.2d 710 
(App. Div. 1994), the court went one step further. In Clute, a court earlier had overturned a 
zoning board’s grant of an area variance because the board had not properly weighed the 
statutory factors. Id. at 711. The court held that the judicial determination did not prevent a 
successor-in-interest, who purchased the parcel from the initial applicant, from seeking the same 
area variance the court had overturned already, provided that the applicant produced “additional 
evidence other than that submitted on the prior application to avoid the preclusive effect of [the 
court’s] prior decision . . . .” Id. at 712. 
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respect, the judicial decision, like a prior board decision, has only issue 
preclusive effect; if the board decides that the subsequent application 
should be granted because the new application raises issues it had not 
considered on the first application, the board is free to do so. For 
instance, in Filanowski v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,179 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the grant of a variance to build an 
apartment complex in a single-family district despite the same board’s 
denial of a variance, affirmed by a court, several years earlier. The court 
noted that since the prior variance denial, the city had rezoned abutting 
land to permit apartments—a change of circumstance that entitled the 
board to consider the application, unconstrained by its prior decision. 
And in Bressman v. Gash,180 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld 
a variance grant, in the face of a prior judicial decision adverse to the 
landowner, where the landowner’s application, rather than 
circumstances, had changed. In Bressman, the zoning board had initially 
granted the landowner a variance from the ordinance’s rear setback 
requirement. While neighbors challenged the grant, the landowner built 
the house in reliance on the variance, only to have the Appellate 
Division reverse the trial court’s decision upholding the variance. The 
landowner then exchanged some land with a neighbor to increase the 
distance between his house and the rear lot line, reducing the magnitude 
of the variance he needed. When the town planning board approved the 
landowner’s newly submitted variance application,181 the neighbors 
sought judicial review, invoking res judicata doctrine. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the planning board had not acted arbitrarily in 
concluding that differences between the two applications justified 
consideration of the second application on the merits. 
To summarize, then, the effect of a prior judicial decision on a 
landowner’s variance or special permit application is identical to the 
effect of a board decision, with one significant exception: if a party 
seeks judicial review of a board decision, an adverse judicial decision 
bars the party from advancing, on a subsequent application, any claims 
that the party could have raised in the initial litigation. It is only to that 
extent that a judicial decision has any claim preclusive effect on a 
subsequent application. 
E.  Ohio Exceptionalism 
Alone among the states, the Ohio courts appear inclined to apply 
traditional claim preclusion doctrine to variance and special permit 
                                                                                                                     
 179. 266 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1970). 
 180. 621 A.2d 476 (N.J. 1993). 
 181. Because the landowner needed minor subdivision approval with respect to the 
exchange of land, the Board of Adjustment had transferred the variance application to the 
planning board. Id. at 480. 
48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/3
2011] ZONING FINALITY 1187 
 
determinations by zoning boards. In Grava v. Parkman Township,182 a 
4-3 majority of the Ohio Supreme Court overruled precedent by holding 
that claim preclusion doctrine prevented a landowner who previously 
had been denied a variance from later seeking to establish that the 
landowner’s use was a pre-existing nonconforming use that did not 
require a variance. Because the board itself had applied claim preclusion 
principles to bar the landowner’s subsequent application, the court 
could have applied principles of deference to reach the same result.183 
But the court went out of its way to emphasize the need to provide 
parties with an incentive to raise all issues at one time in order to 
conserve judicial and quasi-judicial time and resources.184 As a result, 
the court barred the landowner’s claim, even though the issue raised by 
the landowner in the second proceeding (whether the use was a 
nonconforming use) was different from the issue in the first proceeding 
(whether the landowner was entitled to a variance).185 Although the 
result is entirely consistent with traditional claim preclusion doctrine, it 
is inconsistent with issue preclusion doctrine and with the approach 
followed in other states. 
In two subsequent cases, the Ohio appellate courts have invoked 
Grava to permit neighbors to overturn variance grants when the board 
previously had denied variances to the same landowners. In Rossow v. 
City of Ravenna186 and Dinks II Co. v. Chagrin Falls Village Council,187 
Ohio appellate courts emphasized that “[a]n appellate court applies a de 
novo standard of review on a determination of whether an action is 
barred by res judicata,”188 and concluded that, even though the second 
application differed from the first in a number of particulars, res 
judicata doctrine required invalidation of the board’s grant of the second 
variance.189 These cases are very much at odds with the approach 
                                                                                                                     
 182. 653 N.E.2d 226 (Ohio 1995). 
 183. Indeed, an earlier Ohio Supreme Court decision, Set Products, Inc. v. Bainbridge 
Township Board of Zoning Appeals, 510 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1987), appeared to take this 
approach, holding that a board’s determination that circumstances had not changed “will not be 
questioned, absent a showing that the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or constituted an 
abuse of discretion.” Id. at 377. Although the Grava court cited the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision, see Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 228, nowhere did it suggest comparable deference to board 
determinations. 
 184. See Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 230. 
 185. Id. at 228; see also Bohach v. Advery, No. 00 CA 265, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3425, 
at *2–4, *18–19 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 2002) (applying the same approach on facts nearly 
identical to those in Grava). 
 186. No. 2001-P-0036, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1498 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2002). 
 187. No. 84939, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2213 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 2005). 
 188. Rossow, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1498, at *6; see also Dinks II, 2005 Ohio App 
LEXIS 2213, at *12 (“The applicability of res judicata is a question of law that is subject to de 
novo review.”). 
 189. In Rossow, the second application eliminated a request for a rear yard variance and 
modified the request for side yard setbacks. 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1498, at *8. In Dinks II, the 
second application made provision for offsite employee parking. 2005 Ohio App LEXIS 2213, 
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prevalent in other states.190 
CONCLUSION 
In the zoning context, as in other contexts, balancing flexibility and 
finality presents significant challenges. General statements that zoning 
board decisions are entitled to res judicata effect unless circumstances 
have changed obfuscate the generally coherent pattern that courts follow 
in evaluating preclusion claims. A close analysis of land use cases and 
policy establishes that claim preclusion has no place in zoning doctrine;  
rather, a combination of issue preclusion and judicial deference protects 
boards and neighbors against landowners seeking to take multiple bites 
out of the same apple. 
 
                                                                                                                     
at *18. 
 190. One Ohio appellate court has recognized that strict application of res judicata doctrine 
would leave a landowner “forever barred from requesting a variance after having a variance 
once denied despite one’s best effort to change one’s proposal to ameliorate the concerns of the 
applicable board.” Davis v. Coventry Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 20085, 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 513, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2001). In Davis, the court held that a board could not 
invoke res judicata to deny landowner a variance different in several respects from the variance 
the board had previously denied. The court distinguished Grava, noting that in that case, only 
the landowner’s theory of relief, not the substance of landowner’s application, had changed. Id. 
at *6–7. 
In one important respect, however, the court’s approach in Davis is consistent with that 
taken in Grava and applied in other Ohio cases. The court treated the preclusion issue as a pure 
question of law, with no deference to the decision of the zoning board. Id. at *4. The principle 
that courts should review de novo res judicata claims is inconsistent with the approach taken 
outside of Ohio. 
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